Models, Theories, and Laws in Philosophy of Science and Science Education

Abstract

Models, theories, and laws are important in both philosophy of science and science education. However, there is a continuous discussion among philosophers of science about these concepts, and it is difficult to achieve consensus. Similarly, in science education there is a continuous debate that leads to controversies. In the face of these difficulties, some scholars have suggested that we follow “science as practiced by scientists” (Levere, Interchange, 37, 115–128; 2006). History of science, however, shows that on many occasions what the scientists publish in their original papers is quite different from what they actually did. Given the complexity of the issues involved, some science educators have suggested that after having adopted empiricism and historicism in the past, science educators now need to adopt the model-based view based on naturalized philosophy of science (Duschl and Grandy, Science & Education, 22(9), 2109–2139; 2013). The model-based view seems to emphasize cognitive psychology and ignore the historical reconstructions. Ronald Giere’s naturalism provided one possible alternative by placing the philosophy of science at the same level as history of science, referred to as perspectivism (Giere 2006a, b). Other philosophers (Denis Phillips and Harvey Siegel) consider that the historical reconstructions can even extend the naturalistic philosophy of science. One way to retain the history of science in the curriculum is to follow the tactics and strategies of eighteenth and nineteenth century scientists as suggested by James Conant. In this context, I have presented evidence of various episodes from twentieth century science that can also qualify for inclusion in the science curriculum, such as: the oil drop experiment, the alpha particle experiments, the atomic models and the ensuing controversies, Millikan’s determination of Planck’s constant and rejection of Einstein’s quantum hypothesis, the wave-particle duality, and Martin Perl’s discovery of the Tau Lepton. An important underlying aspect of these historical episodes is that scientific knowledge is perspectival rather than absolutely objective, leading to the tentative nature of scientific theories. Furthermore, besides underdetermination some contingency is always present in any science, that is, the same experimental observations can be explained by rival theories and their acceptance may depend on the order in which these are presented to the scientific community (e.g., quantum mechanics and bond formation).