Abstract
This paper gives a simple proof of the following result, which is due to Maskin [1]: If an n-person social choice rule f, with n≥3, satisfied monotonicity and no veto power, then f can be implemented in Nash equilibria.
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Maskin E Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Math Oper, forthcoming
Williams S Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation, IMA mimeo, Minneapolis, 1984
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Repullo, R. A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation. Soc Choice Welfare 4, 39–41 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433954
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433954