Abstract
Despite an immense amount of literature on the topic of trust, there is still no account that offers a plausible epistemological framework for the phenomenon of reasonable trust. The main claim of this article is that reasonable trust and distrust are phenomena based upon practical knowledge, while non-reasonable trust and distrust result from dislocation of trust into different epistemic regimes. This dislocation can be observed in some of the influential theories such as cognitive and emotional accounts of trust and in the accounts understanding trust as a form of faith. Added to that, theoretical approaches introducing a strong idea of basic trust preclude observing the difference between reasonable and non-reasonable trust. In this article, I argue that reasonable trust is founded upon practical knowledge which includes knowledge of integrity of the trusted person and knowledge about a similarity of worldviews of the trust giver and the trust receiver. Furthermore, I elaborate on the ways reasonable trust and distrust are being transformed and disfigured in other epistemic regimes. Drawing mainly upon Aristotelian understanding of practical knowledge, I want to show how non-reasonable trust and distrust are manifested in the phenomena of blind trust, unconditional trust and absolute doubt and explain why non-reasonable trust and distrust can hardly be distinguished from loyalty, subordination, infatuation or calculation.
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Related to the above is the idea that trust is not based upon knowledge but represents a strategic behavior one chooses in order to bridge this lack (Barbalet, 2009: 369), a “forced option” (2009: 372) of leaning upon someone. It is understood as a form of action (Barbalet, 2009: 369) instead of as a state of mind, of making oneself deliberately dependent so as to achieve a desired outcome. Trust is here regarded as a willful and calculative behavior of leaning upon another.
Indeed, this automatized version of phronesis could be tricky ground. Intuitions can become steady and cover up the unceasing change and variability of human affairs and characters, possibly turning the advantage of experience into blindness for differences.
On the other hand, one can indeed have quite a limited knowledge of another’s integrity and in that case there can be room to decide whether to trust.
For instance, to totally trust a person would assume that another would only not come on time to a special occasion if there was some vis maior to prevent her or him from doing so, while to trust another slightly less would mean to expect him/her to come on time with some possibility that he or she might be late etc.
Maybe one could think of some rudimentary forms of trust in some higher mammal species, but this interesting issue is out of the scope of this article.
For a well-argued critique of this point see McLeod (2000: 466).
Endreß suitably notes that loyalty must not always be accompanied by trust (Endreß, 2002: 73).
A contrary case would be one when the same child could be reasonably trusted to have seen a dog playing outside.
Both examples involve a closely related and highly interesting topic of trusting testimonies already debated by scholars (for instance, Prijić-Samardžija, 2018) that cannot be discussed here at length, but it is important to mention that evidence contradicting a testimony (shared information) can render trust non-reasonable.
Authors who observe trust as primarily affective phenomenon, mostly maintain a concept of emotion which can infuse some cognitive aspects.
Giddens also brought trust into connection with ontological security (Giddens, 2012).
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Franeta, D. Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions. Hum Stud 45, 719–738 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-022-09651-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-022-09651-5