Results 21 to 30 of about 2,662 (69)

Recognising Multidimensional Euclidean Preferences

, 2016
Euclidean preferences are a widely studied preference model, in which decision makers and alternatives are embedded in d-dimensional Euclidean space. Decision makers prefer those alternatives closer to them.
Peters, Dominik
core   +1 more source

Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques [PDF]

, 2017
SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities.
Almalawi, August, Baecher, Boldea, Bouchti, Brand, Byres, Bytschkow, Carcano, Cavalieri, Chabuksawar, Cherdantseva, Ciancamerla, Clarke, Constantin, Curtis, Davies, Dilip Patel, Disso, Dondossola, Dong, Downs, ENISA, Erol-Kantarci, Farooqui, Fovino, Fovino, Genge, Genge, Giani, Goldenberg, Guide to industrial control systems (ICS), Hahn, Hemingway, Henry, Henry, Honeyd, Hug, Huitsing, IEEE Standard for Modeling and Simulation (M&S) High Level Architecture (HLA)– Framework and Rules, Igure, Information Security Management (ISMS), Jain, Jiang, Jin, Kesler, Kirsch, Langner, Leitner, Leszczyna, Li, Li, Li, MacDermott, Mahboob, Mahoney, Mallouhi, Markovic-Petrovic, Mathioudakis, Maynard, Metasploit, Mets, Microsoft Security Bulletins, Mo, Moore, Morris, Moya, Nader, NETA, nmap, Novak, O'Kane, Oman, OpenSCADA, OSSEC, OSSIM, Pauna, Peterson, Pham, Phillips, Pidikiti, Piggin, Protecting Industrial Control Systems, Queiroz, Queiroz, Ralston, Roberts, Sajid Nazir, SCADA, Scarfone, Scarfone, Schneier, Shushma Patel, Simmhan, Slay, Snort, Sploitware, Sridhar, Srivastava, Stouffer, Symantec Security Response, Süß, Ten, Ten, Ten, Tesfahun, Torrisi, Urias, Vijayan, White paper, Winn, Wu, Xie, Yang, Yang, Yang, Zhang, Zhang, Zhu, Ćardenas   +119 more
core   +2 more sources

Precise Complexity of the Core in Dichotomous and Additive Hedonic Games

, 2017
Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition.
A Bogomolnaia, C Ballester, D Dimitrov, GJ Woeginger, GJ Woeginger, H Aziz, K Cechlárová, KI Ko, LJ Stockmeyer, S Banerjee, SC Sung   +10 more
core   +1 more source

Dividing bads under additive utilities [PDF]

, 2019
We compare the Egalitarian rule (aka Egalitarian Equivalent) and the Competitive rule (aka Comeptitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) to divide bads (chores).
Bogomolnaia, Anna, Moulin, Herve, Sandomirskiy, Fedor, Yanovskaia, Elena   +3 more
core   +1 more source

Game Theory : A Case of Infectious Diseases

, 2020
Game theory is a mathematical model which deals with interactions between various entities by analyzing the strategies and choices. In today’s world, Game Theory is being extensively used in fields like computer science, economics, sociology, political ...
Adekunle A. Yinka Prof., Seun Ebiesuwa, Ohwo Onome Blaise   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games [PDF]

, 2016
Inspired by the study of control scenarios in elections and complementing manipulation and bribery settings in cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce the notion of structural control in weighted voting games.
Rey, Anja
core   +1 more source

Non-cooperative games with preplay negotiations [PDF]

, 2015
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, in order to provide ...
Goranko, V, Turrini, P
core   +2 more sources

Prediction with Expert Advice under Discounted Loss

, 2010
We study prediction with expert advice in the setting where the losses are accumulated with some discounting---the impact of old losses may gradually vanish.
A. Chernov, B. Schölkopf, D. Haussler, D.A. Harville, E.F. Beckenbach, E.S. Gardner, J.F. Muth, M. Herbster, N. Cesa-Bianchi, R. Sutton, V. Vovk, V. Vovk, V. Vovk, Y. Kalnishkan   +13 more
core   +1 more source

The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant [PDF]

, 2018
We study the price of anarchy and the structure of equilibria in network creation games. A network creation game is played by n players {1,2, ,n}, each identified with a vertex of a graph (network), where the strategy of player i, i=1,
Mihalák, Matúš, Schlegel, Jan
core   +1 more source

Implications of Selfish Neighbor Selection in Overlay Networks [PDF]

, 2006
In a typical overlay network for routing or content sharing, each node must select a fixed number of immediate overlay neighbors for routing traffic or content queries.
Laoutaris, Nikolaos, Smaragdakis, Georgios, Bestavros, Azer, Byers, John W.   +3 more
core