Results 261 to 270 of about 1,355,229 (310)

A LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODEL FOR SOLVING COMPLEX 2‐PERSON ZERO‐SUM GAMES

open access: closedStudies in Economics and Finance, 1990
Two‐person zero‐sum game theory has long been a popular topic of research in business and economics. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how to convert a two‐person zero‐sum game into a linear programming problem and to present a computer simulation model for solving large bilateral zero‐sum games problems.
Mike C. Patterson
openaire   +2 more sources

On Stationary Strategies in Positive Stochastic 1 and 2 Person Games with General State Space

open access: closed, 1984
The paper deals with general state space dynamic programming problems with positive rewards. For two-person stochastic games with a special law of motion the existence of uniformly good stationary strategies is stated. The question, whether this is also true for games with an arbitrary law of motion, is left open, but the result can be applied to one ...
R. van Dawen
openaire   +3 more sources

A 2-Person Game with Lack of Information on 1½ Sides

Mathematics of Operations Research, 1985
We consider a repeated 2-person 0-sum game with incomplete information about the pay-off matrix. Player I (maximizer) knows the real pay-off matrix but he is uncertain about the beliefs of his opponent. We show that in this case the Aumann-Maschler results on incomplete information on one side no longer hold.
Sylvain Sorin, Shmuel Zamir
openaire   +1 more source

A Dynamical View of Different Solution Paradigms in Two-Person Symmetric Games: Nash Versus Co-action Equilibria

, 2015
The study of games and their equilibria is central to developing insights for understanding many socio-economic phenomena. Here we present a dynamical systems view of the equilibria of two-person, payoff-symmetric games.
V. Sasidevan, S. Sinha
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Extension of 2 Person Zero Sum Game

1975
Let X and Y “be the pure strategy sets of 2 players Xavier and Yves. Then every payoff function g: X × Y → R defin es a 2 person zero sum game where Xavier maximize and Yves minimize. An extension of the games with pure strategy set X and Y is a “way of playing” the game, which associates to every payoff function g a “value”, in the duality interval
openaire   +1 more source

Reasonable Nash demand games

Theory and Decision, 2021
Shiran Rachmilevitch
semanticscholar   +1 more source

A Note on Berge Equilibria in n-Person 2-Strategy Games

open access: closed, 2020
Paweł Sawicki   +2 more
openalex   +1 more source

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