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Establishment of conventions: Application of theory of games [PDF]
The paper deals with application of theory of games in explanation of convention establishment. Conventions are outcome ("equilibrium") of repeated game.
Stojanović Božo J.
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Memory-two zero-determinant strategies in repeated games
Repeated games have provided an explanation of how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favourable in a one-shot game in the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation.
Masahiko Ueda
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Landscape and flux for quantifying global stability and dynamics of game theory. [PDF]
Game theory has been widely applied to many research areas including economics, biology and social sciences. However, it is still challenging to quantify the global stability and global dynamics of the game theory.
Li Xu, Jin Wang
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Sequencing Games with Repeated Players [PDF]
Consider a sequencing situation in which a finite set of players, \(N\), are assigned to a finite set of jobs, \(M\), in a certain sequence, \(s\), with an attached cost profile \(c(s)\). Let \((N, v)\) be the cooperative game associated with the sequencing situation, where \(v(S)\) maximizes cost savings for coalition \(S\) to fill all jobs. The paper
Arantza Estévez-Fernández +3 more
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Ransomware is a particular form of cyber-attack in which a victim loses access to either his electronic device or files unless he pays a ransom to criminals. A criminal’s ability to make money from ransomware critically depends on victims believing
Anna Cartwright, Edward Cartwright
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Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation based on game models [PDF]
To elucidate the mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation has been a core problem in biology, economics and sociology. Evolutionary game theory has proven to be an efficient approach to investigate the problem by using models based on so-called social
Hui Zhang, Meng Gao
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Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games [PDF]
In a companion paper [`Learning to play equilibrium', Northwestern University, Evanston (1990)], the authors show that utility maximizing players, holding subjective beliefs about their opponents' strategies in an infinitely repeated game, must converge to a subjective equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, players' forecasts on the actual future play of
Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer
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Evolution of cooperation by reciprocity has been studied using two-player and n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. An interesting feature specific to the n-player case is that players can vary in generosity, or how many defections they ...
Shun Kurokawa +2 more
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From repeated games to Brownian games [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Communication and cooperation in repeated games [PDF]
We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set ofε‐coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (ε‐CCE) of the underlying one‐shot game. The value ofεdepends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring.
Awaya, Yu, Krishna, Vijay
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