Results 1 to 10 of about 809,468 (200)
Parabolic Cylinders and Folk Theorems [PDF]
We study a class of games featuring payoff functions being parabolic cylinders where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion on the Pareto frontier is ...
Delbono, Flavio, Lambertini, Luca
openaire +3 more sources
Folk Theorems on the Determinization and Minimization of Timed Automata [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +2 more sources
The Folk Theorems in the Framework of Evolution and Cooperation [PDF]
Proceeding from the latest versions of the Folk theorems, this chapter shows that “natural” evolution of behavior in repeated games in human populations is a very unstable process which may be easily manipulated by outside forces. Any feasible and individually rational payoff of the game may be converted into a globally stable outcome by an arbitrary ...
openaire +2 more sources
Folk Theorems, Second Version [PDF]
Much of the repeated game literature is concerned with proving Folk Theorems. The logic of the exercise is to specify a particular game, and to explore for that game specification whether any given feasible (and individually rational) value vector can be an equilibrium outcome for some strategies when agents are sufficiently patient.
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite
openaire +2 more sources
Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory [PDF]
Abstract It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.
openaire +2 more sources
The Stackelberg vs. Nash-Cournot Folk-theorem in International Environmental Agreements
Michael Finus, F. Furini, A. V. Rohrer
semanticscholar +1 more source
"One more time": time loops as a tool to investigate folk conceptions of moral responsibility and human agency. [PDF]
Giraud T, Neves Leal M, Cova F.
europepmc +1 more source
Blockchains are distributed ledgers, operated within peer-to-peer networks. If reliable and stable, they could offer a new, cost effective way to record transactions, but are they? We model the proof-of-work blockchain protocol as a stochastic game and analyse the equilibrium strategies of rational, strategic miners.
Biais, Bruno +3 more
openaire +2 more sources
Identifying Climatic Drivers of Hybridization with a New Ancestral Niche Reconstruction Method. [PDF]
Folk RA +9 more
europepmc +1 more source
Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity. [PDF]
Tkadlec J, Hilbe C, Nowak MA.
europepmc +1 more source

