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On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem. [PDF]
PLoS ONE, 2015 In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for
Jiawei Li, Graham Kendall
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A folk theorem for minority games. [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 We study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms.
Jerome Renault +2 more
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Folk Theorem with Communication [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Ichiro Obara
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A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games [PDF]
Economic Theory, 2007 We analyze “dynastic” repeated games. A stage game is repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences.
Dino Gerardi +2 more
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The bounded memory folk theorem [PDF]
, 2011 We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded-memory pure strategies. Our result requires each player’s payoff to be strictly above the pure minmax payoff but requires neither time-dependent strategies, nor ...
Barlo, Mehmet +2 more
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A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem : when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent)
Jeffrey Ely
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"The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring" [PDF]
The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring, 2001 This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is imperfect and private, and players' private signal structures satisfy the conditional independence. We
Hitoshi Matsushima
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Folk Theorems for Present-Biased Players [PDF]
, 2011 The folk theorems for infinitely repeated games with discounting presume that the discount rate between two successive periods is constant. Following the literature on quasi-exponential or hyperbolic discounting, I model the repeated interaction between ...
Bernergård, Axel
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Deficiencies of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in Explaining the Emergence of Institutions: Introducing an Alternative [PDF]
فصلنامه پژوهشهای اقتصادی ایران, 2023 Over the past half-century, the impact of the prisoner’s dilemma has transcended its initial boundaries, influencing a broad spectrum of institutional studies and analyses of interdependent systems, such as collective action, public goods, governance of ...
Farshad Momeni, Reza Shohreh
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2023 In this paper, we examine Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPE) within an infinite horizon oligopolistic market, accounting for the possibility of firm bankruptcy. Central to our dynamic analysis is the concept of Bankruptcy-Free (BF) allocations. The consideration of bankruptcy introduces several distinctive features not encompassed by standard models
Carmen Beviá +2 more
openaire +3 more sources