Results 31 to 40 of about 809,468 (200)
The truth behind the myth of the Folk theorem [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2014 We study the problem of computing an $ε$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players as polynomial-time Turing machines that maintain state ---and make some standard cryptographic hardness assumptions (the
Joseph Y. Halpern +2 more
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A Folk Theorem for Bargaining Games [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012 We study strategies with one–period recall in the context of a general class of multilateral bargaining games. A strategy has one–period recall if actions in a particular period are only conditioned on information in the previous and the current period.
Herings P.J.J. +2 more
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Critical Discount Factor Values in Discounted Supergames
Games, 2018 This paper examines the subgame-perfect equilibria in symmetric 2×2 supergames. We solve the smallest discount factor value for which the players obtain all the feasible and individually rational payoffs as equilibrium payoffs.
Kimmo Berg, Markus Kärki
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The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information [PDF]
Econometrica, 1994 Summary: We study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played. We provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible, individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting.
Fudenberg, Drew +2 more
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Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Christian Borgs +5 more
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What You Gotta Know to Play Good in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Games, 2015 For the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma there exist good strategies which solve the problem when we restrict attention to the long term average payoff. When used by both players, these assure the cooperative payoff for each of them.
Ethan Akin
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Two-person adversarial games are zero-sum: An elaboration of a folk theorem [PDF]
Economics LettersThe observation that every two-person adversarial game is an affine transformation of a zero-sum game is traceable to Luce&Raiffa (1957) and made explicit in Aumann (1987). Recent work of (ADP) Adler et al.
¶. DavidSchrittesser +21 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
The American Economic Review, 2020 We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types” who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a ...
Takuo Sugaya, A. Wolitzky
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A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
International Journal of Game Theory, 2020 This paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring.
Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa
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The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching
, 2020 We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non‐uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality.
Joyee Deb, Takuo Sugaya, A. Wolitzky
semanticscholar +1 more source