Results 21 to 30 of about 22,191 (172)
What You Gotta Know to Play Good in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
For the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma there exist good strategies which solve the problem when we restrict attention to the long term average payoff. When used by both players, these assure the cooperative payoff for each of them.
Ethan Akin
doaj +1 more source
We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded memory (recall) strategies. Our main result demonstrates that any payoff profile that exceeds the pure minmax payoff profile can be approximately sustained by a pure strategy finite memory subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game if the players are ...
Barlo, Mehmet +2 more
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Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Attar, A +3 more
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Parabolic Cylinders and Folk Theorems [PDF]
We study a class of games featuring payoff functions being parabolic cylinders where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion on the Pareto frontier is ...
Delbono, Flavio, Lambertini, Luca
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Evolution Game Model of Travel Mode Choice in Metropolitan
The paper describes an evolution game model of travel mode choice to determine whether transportation policies would have the desired effect. The model is first expressed as a two-stage sequential game in the extensive form based on the similarity ...
Chaoqun Wu, Yulong Pei, Jingpeng Gao
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Are ?Anti-Folk Theorems? in repeated games nongeneric? [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Roger Lagunoff, Akihiko Matsui
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Sensitivity and Hamming Graphs
ABSTRACT For any m ≥ 3 $m\ge 3$ we show that the Hamming graph H ( n , m ) $H(n,m)$ admits an imbalanced partition into m $m$ sets, each inducing a subgraph of low maximum degree. This improves previous results by Tandya and by Potechin and Tsang, and disproves the Strong m $m$‐ary Sensitivity Conjecture of Asensio, García‐Marco, and Knauer.
Sara Asensio +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Designing fair and sustainable pricing mechanisms for health insurance requires accurate risk assessment and the formulation of incentive-compatible strategies among stakeholders.
Saeed Shouri +2 more
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Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley +1 more source
1-loop renormalisability of integrable sigma-models from 4d Chern-Simons theory
Large families of integrable 2d σ-models have been constructed at the classical level, partly motivated by the utility of integrability on the string worldsheet.
Sylvain Lacroix +2 more
doaj +1 more source

