Results 11 to 20 of about 22,191 (172)
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information [PDF]
Econometrica, 1994 Summary: We study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played. We provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible, individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting.
Fudenberg, Drew +2 more
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A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 1995 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Bayesian Sensitivity Analysis for Causal Estimation With Time-Varying Unmeasured Confounding. [PDF]
Stat MedABSTRACT Causal inference relies on the untestable assumption of no unmeasured confounding to ensure the causal parameter of interest is identifiable. Sensitivity analysis quantifies the unmeasured confounding's impact on causal estimates. Among sensitivity analysis methods proposed in the literature, the latent confounder approach is favored for its ...
Zou Y +4 more
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Some examples for stable and historic behavior in replicator equations
Examples and Counterexamples, 2022 The evolutionary dynamics of zero-sum and non zero-sum games under replicator equations could be drastically different from each other. In zero-sum games, heteroclinic cycles naturally occur whenever the species of the population supersede each other in ...
Mansoor Saburov
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Reactive Strategies: An Inch of Memory, a Mile of Equilibria
Games, 2021 We explore how an incremental change in complexity of strategies (“an inch of memory”) in repeated interactions influences the sets of Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy and payoff profiles. For this, we introduce the two most basic setups of repeated games,
Artem Baklanov
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The Blockchain Folk Theorem [PDF]
The Review of Financial Studies, 2018 Blockchains are distributed ledgers, operated within peer-to-peer networks. If reliable and stable, they could offer a new, cost effective way to record transactions, but are they? We model the proof-of-work blockchain protocol as a stochastic game and analyse the equilibrium strategies of rational, strategic miners.
Biais, Bruno +3 more
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Folk Theorems, Second Version [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013 Much of the repeated game literature is concerned with proving Folk Theorems. The logic of the exercise is to specify a particular game, and to explore for that game specification whether any given feasible (and individually rational) value vector can be an equilibrium outcome for some strategies when agents are sufficiently patient.
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite
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A commitment folk theorem [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Kalai, Adam Tauman +3 more
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A Folk Theorem for Bargaining Games [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012 We study strategies with one–period recall in the context of a general class of multilateral bargaining games. A strategy has one–period recall if actions in a particular period are only conditioned on information in the previous and the current period.
Herings P.J.J. +2 more
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Critical Discount Factor Values in Discounted Supergames
Games, 2018 This paper examines the subgame-perfect equilibria in symmetric 2×2 supergames. We solve the smallest discount factor value for which the players obtain all the feasible and individually rational payoffs as equilibrium payoffs.
Kimmo Berg, Markus Kärki
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