Results 11 to 20 of about 809,468 (200)
On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem. [PDF]
PLoS ONE, 2015 In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for
Jiawei Li, Graham Kendall
doaj +7 more sources
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 The authors prove the folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. A number of theorems and lemmas are established for sequential equilibrium. It is also stated that the strategies can as well be implemented by finite automata. A nice theoretical paper to read.
Jeffrey C Ely, Juuso Välimäki
exaly +8 more sources
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2023 In this paper, we examine Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPE) within an infinite horizon oligopolistic market, accounting for the possibility of firm bankruptcy. Central to our dynamic analysis is the concept of Bankruptcy-Free (BF) allocations. The consideration of bankruptcy introduces several distinctive features not encompassed by standard models
Carmen Beviá +2 more
semanticscholar +5 more sources
The tripartite auction folk theorem
European Economic Review, 2023 We formally study two bidder first-price, second-price, and all-pay auctions with known values, deriving the equilibrium payoffs and strategies and showing when all three yield the same equilibrium payoffs to the bidders. This latter result, the tripartite auction theorem, does not hold for all auctions, in particular it can fail for symmetric auctions
Levine D. K., Mattozzi A., Modica S.
semanticscholar +5 more sources
A folk theorem for minority games [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2005 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Jérôme Renault +2 more
openaire +5 more sources
Bounded memory Folk Theorem [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2016 We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded memory (recall) strategies. Our main result demonstrates that any payoff profile that exceeds the pure minmax payoff profile can be approximately sustained by a pure strategy finite memory subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game if the players are ...
Mehmet Barlo +2 more
openaire +6 more sources
Folk theorem with communication [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Ichiro Obara
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The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time
Theoretical Economics, 2016 We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games.
Christoph Frei
exaly +2 more sources
A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games [PDF]
Economic Theory, 2007 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Anderlini L., Gerardi D., Lagunoff R.
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A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
Theoretical Economics, 2015 We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games, in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed.
Marcin Pęski, Thomas Wiseman
exaly +2 more sources