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Qua‐Talk and Other Forms of Quackery: Part One
Philosophy Compass, Volume 20, Issue 11, November 2025.ABSTRACT The Latin term “qua” is used occasionally in ordinary discourse but more often as a philosophical term of art. Its purpose is sometimes to avoid what would otherwise be contradictions, as in “necessarily two‐legged qua cyclist, contingently two‐legged qua mathematician.” In this paper, I identify and clarify several of the philosophical uses ...
James Van Cleve
wiley +1 more source
Limit properties of Bertrand equilibria with exogenous entry [PDF]
For a large class of demand and cost functions, we characterize the limit equilibrium set under Bertrand oligopoly when entry is exogenous. Unless average cost is constant, we find that the folk theorem of perfect competition necessarily fails.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
core
Ratio Juris, Volume 38, Issue 3, Page 198-235, November 2025.Abstract This essay revisits the early methodology of Rudolph von Jhering. It has often been dismissed due to its heavy metaphysics, unwieldy presentation, and alleged neglect of teleology. But a charitable reconstruction in contemporary terms reveals a coherence theory of jurisprudence that is in many ways superior to current coherence accounts.
Pascal Felix Meier
wiley +1 more source
"Randomization, Communication and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring" [PDF]
The present paper shows that the Folk Theorem under imperfect (public) information (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994)) can be obtained under much weaker set of assumptions, if we allow communication among players.
Michihiro Kandori
core
Nonrecursive dynamic incentives: A rate of convergence approach
Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 4, Page 1461-1520, November 2025.In repeated principal‐agent problems and games, more outcomes are implementable when performance signals are privately observed by a principal or mediator with commitment power than when the same signals are publicly observed and form the basis of a recursive equilibrium. We investigate the gains from nonrecursive equilibria (e.g., “review strategies”)
Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky
wiley +1 more source
Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games [PDF]
Delayed perfect monitoring in an in nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and
Kinateder, Markus
core +1 more source
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version [PDF]
A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal.
: Wojciech Olszewski, George J. Mailath
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A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms [PDF]
We prove a folk theorem for games in which mechanism designers compete in mechanisms and in which there are at least 4 players. All allocations supportable by a centralized mechanism designer, including allocations involving correlated actions (and ...
Peters, Michael +1 more
core
, 2017 Blockchains are distributed ledgers, operated within peer-to-peer networks. If reliable and stable, they could offer a new, cost effective, way to record transactions and asset ownership, but are they? We model the blockchain as a stochastic game and analyse the equilibrium strategies of rational, strategic miners. We show that mining the longest chain
Biais, Bruno +3 more
openaire +1 more source
Over- and under-investment according to different benchmarks [PDF]
In a two-stage oligopoly, with investment in the first stage and quantity or price competition in the second stage, there is a kind of Folk Theorem: We find (i) over-investment if the goods are substitutes and competition is in strategic substitutes, (ii)
Bolle, Friedel
core