Results 51 to 60 of about 809,468 (200)
The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 This paper studies repeated games with private monitoring where players make optimal decisions with respect to costly monitoring activities, just as they do with respect to stage-game actions. We consider the case where each player can observe other players' current-period actions accurately only if he incurs a certain level of disutility.
Miyagawa, Eiichi +2 more
openaire +4 more sources
1-loop renormalisability of integrable sigma-models from 4d Chern-Simons theory
Journal of High Energy PhysicsLarge families of integrable 2d σ-models have been constructed at the classical level, partly motivated by the utility of integrability on the string worldsheet.
Sylvain Lacroix +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley +1 more source
An ecclesiastical court: Christian nationalism and perceptions of the US Supreme Court
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract Recently, scholars have increasingly examined the unique blending of Christian and political ideology known as Christian nationalism. During this period, the US Supreme Court has increasingly ruled in ways that favor Christian nationalism, and Court watchers have criticized several justices for showing bias toward Christianity at best and ...
Miles T. Armaly +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Why did Putin invade Ukraine? A theory of degenerate autocracy
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract Many dictatorships end up with a series of disastrous decisions such as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. Even if a certain policy choice is not ultimately fatal for the regime, such as Mao's Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot's collectivization drive, they typically involve both a miscalculation ...
Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin
wiley +1 more source
The Folk Theorem of Decreasing Effectiveness of Monetary Policy: What Do the Data Say?
, 2018 It is increasingly claimed that unconventional monetary policies are subject to decreasing effectiveness in supporting growth and raising the inflation rate.
U. Panizza, Charles Wyplosz
semanticscholar +1 more source
Asymmetric sanctions and corruption: Theory and practice in China
Economic Inquiry, EarlyView.Abstract Asymmetric punishment of partners in crime, intended to incentivize whistle‐blowing, may increase detection and deterrence. The idea is age‐old but its use against corruption is not frequent. We study a 1997 Chinese reform that strengthened such asymmetries for some forms of bribery.
Maria Perrotta Berlin +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Detecting Informed Trading Risk from Undercutting Activity
The Journal of Finance, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We introduce a simple measure of informed trading risk, QIDres$QID^{res}$, the residual to liquidity quote‐improvement‐to‐deterioration ratio times −1$-1$. When facing with increased informed trading risk, liquidity providers compete less to provide liquidity, reducing their undercutting activity. Reductions in undercutting leave footprints in
YASHAR H. BARARDEHI +2 more
wiley +1 more source
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games [PDF]
A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a “dynastic” repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences.
Roger Lagunoff +2 more
core +2 more sources
Noûs, EarlyView.ABSTRACT I argue that knowledge plays a distinctive role in psychological explanation that weaker epistemic states cannot because it is robust in the face of counterevidence in a way that they are not. Being robust in the face of counterevidence makes your belief robust in the face of counterargument.
Spencer Paulson
wiley +1 more source