Program Equilibria and Discounted Computation Time [PDF]
Tennenholtz (GEB 2004) developed Program Equilibrium to model play in a finite two-player game where each player can base their strategy on the other player's strategies.
Lance Fortnow
core
The Folk theorem and bertrand competition [PDF]
We examine if the folk theorem of perfect competition holds under Bertrand competition (when firms supply all demand), both when entry is exogenous, as well as when it is free.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
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Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information [PDF]
The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payo®s. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the ...
Jonathan Thomas, Martin W. Cripps
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"One more time": time loops as a tool to investigate folk conceptions of moral responsibility and human agency. [PDF]
Synthese, 2023 Giraud T, Neves Leal M, Cova F.
europepmc +1 more source
Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games [PDF]
This paper extends the framework of Kajii and Morris (1997) to study the question of robustness to incomplete information in repeated games. We show that dynamically robust equilibria can be characterized using a one-shot robustness principle that ...
Chassang, Sylvain, Takahashi, Satoru
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An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring [PDF]
We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect to finite partitions of past histories), that each period players' preferences over actions are ...
Peski, Marcin
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Identifying Climatic Drivers of Hybridization with a New Ancestral Niche Reconstruction Method. [PDF]
Syst Biol, 2023 Folk RA +9 more
europepmc +1 more source
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies" [PDF]
Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has restricted attention to public strategies; strategies that only depend on history of publicly observable signals, and perfect public equilibrium (PPE); sequential ...
Ichiro Obara, Michihiro Kandori
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A note on the existence of standard splittings for conformally stationary spacetimes
, 2012 Let $(M,g)$ be a spacetime which admits a complete timelike conformal Killing vector field $K$. We prove that $(M,g)$ splits globally as a standard conformastationary spacetime with respect to $K$ if and only if $(M,g)$ is distinguishing (and, thus ...
Beem J K +11 more
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A partial folk theorem for games with private learning [PDF]
The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly, and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature’s ...
Wiseman, Thomas
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