Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring [PDF]
This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed.
Pauline Contou-Carrère, Tristan Tomala
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"The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability" [PDF]
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is truly imperfect and truly private, there exist no public signals and no public randomization devices ...
Hitoshi Matsushima
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International environmental negotiations and non-exclusive domestic property rights [PDF]
A folk theorem in environmental economics suggests that in the presence of transboundary environmental spillovers international negotiations may improve on environmental quality.
Mohr, Ernst
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Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 2023 Tkadlec J, Hilbe C, Nowak MA.
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Analysis of the Influence of Sports on College Students' Music Vocalization Training Based on Monte Carlo and Dynamic Adjustment Factor Algorithm. [PDF]
J Environ Public Health, 2022 Hua L, Yu L.
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On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games [PDF]
This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one.
Johannes Horner +2 more
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Modelling the folk theorem of spatial economics: a heterogeneous regional growth model [PDF]
During the last year, the research field of spatial economic has rapidly increased. There is consensus that the economic performance of a region depends not only on its own potential, but also on the development of their neighbouring regions.
Torben Klarl
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"Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition" [PDF]
This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When agents interact only once, they often have an incentive to deviate from cooperation. In a repeated interaction, however, any mutually beneficial outcome can
Michihiro Kandori
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Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game [PDF]
We study non-linear Markov perfect equilibria in a two agent linear quadratic differential game. In contrast to the literature owing to Tsutsui and Mino (1990), we do not associate endogenous subsets of the state space with candidate solutions.
Colin Rowat
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Bayesian network-based over-sampling method (BOSME) with application to indirect cost-sensitive learning. [PDF]
Sci Rep, 2022 Delgado R, Núñez-González JD.
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