Ability as dependence modality
Noûs, Volume 59, Issue 4, Page 1126-1152, December 2025.Abstract Some modal expressions in language—for example, “can” and “able”—describe what is possible in light of someone's abilities. Ability modals are obviously related to other modalities in language, such as epistemic or deontic modality, but also give rise to anomalies that make them unique.
Paolo Santorio
wiley +1 more source
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version [PDF]
We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict.
George J. Mailath, Wojciech Olszewski
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Social Norms and Choice: A Weak Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games [PDF]
A folk theorem for repeated matching games is established that holds if the stage game is not a pure coordination game. It holds independent of population size and for all matching rules-including rules that depend on players choices or the history of ...
Hasker, Kevin
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"The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability" [PDF]
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is truly imperfect and truly private, there exist no public signals and no public randomization devices ...
Hitoshi Matsushima
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Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version [PDF]
A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal.
George J. Mailath, : Wojciech Olszewski
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Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem [PDF]
We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run ...
Takuo Sugaya +3 more
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Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem [PDF]
We provide game-theoretic foundations for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model of distributive politics.
John Duggan, Seok-ju Cho
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Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring [PDF]
This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed.
Tristan Tomala, Pauline Contou-Carrère
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"Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition" [PDF]
This entry shows why self-interested agents manage to cooperate in a long-term relationship. When agents interact only once, they often have an incentive to deviate from cooperation. In a repeated interaction, however, any mutually beneficial outcome can
Michihiro Kandori
core
Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence [PDF]
This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring.
Yuichi Yamamoto
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