Results 91 to 100 of about 809,468 (200)

The Folk theorem and bertrand competition [PDF]

open access: yes
We examine if the folk theorem of perfect competition holds under Bertrand competition (when firms supply all demand), both when entry is exogenous, as well as when it is free.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
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The bounded memory folk theorem [PDF]

open access: yes, 2011
We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded-memory pure strategies. Our result requires each player’s payoff to be strictly above the pure minmax payoff but requires neither time-dependent strategies, nor ...
Sabourian, Hamid   +2 more
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Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982.
Tomala, Tristan
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Discounted and Finitely Repeated Minority Games with Public Signals. [PDF]

open access: yes
We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only
Scarlatti, Sergio   +2 more
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On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem

open access: yes, 2007
It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk theorem may only be obtained for
Azevedo, Eduardo Monteiro de
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A partial folk theorem for games with private learning

open access: yes
The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly, and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature’s ...
Wiseman, Thomas
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A folk theorem for endogenous reference points

open access: yes
We establish a folk theorem for infinitely repeated game protocols with players whose preferences exhibit backward-looking reference dependence.Reference dependence Habit formation Folk ...
Bernard, Mark
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Coalitional and strategic market games

open access: yes, 2012
Brangewitz S. Coalitional and strategic market games. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2012.This thesis consists of two main parts: The first one is on coalitional market games whereas the second one is on strategic market games.
Brangewitz, Sonja
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