Results 81 to 90 of about 809,468 (200)

Program Equilibria and Discounted Computation Time [PDF]

Tennenholtz (GEB 2004) developed Program Equilibrium to model play in a finite two-player game where each player can base their strategy on the other player's strategies.
Lance Fortnow
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A folk theorem for endogenous reference points

, 2011
We establish a folk theorem for infinitely repeated game protocols with players whose preferences exhibit backward-looking reference ...
Mark Bernard, Bernard, Mark,
core   +1 more source

"Randomization, Communication and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring" [PDF]

The present paper shows that the Folk Theorem under imperfect (public) information (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994)) can be obtained under much weaker set of assumptions, if we allow communication among players.
Michihiro Kandori
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"Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players" [PDF]

We investigate two-player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close to unity. Monitoring is private and players cannot communicate. We require no condition concerning the accuracy of players' monitoring technology.
Hitoshi Matsushima
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Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs [PDF]

This paper studies a class of infinitely repeated games with two players in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one-shot payoff of each player is additively separable in their actions.
Takashi Kamihigashi, Taiji Furusawa
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Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication, [PDF]

This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values.
Masaki Aoyagi
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One - Memory in Repeated Games [PDF]

We study the extent to which equilibrium payo®s of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1 { memory strategies. First, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payo® pro¯le that cannot be obtained by any ...
Barlo, Mehmet, Carmona, Guilherme
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A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma [PDF]

, 1999
We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent ...
Ely, Jeffrey C., Valimaki, Juuso
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When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? [PDF]

We study the relationship between a player’s (stage game) minmax payoff and the individually rational payoff in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
Olivier Gossner, Jöhannes Horner
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How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?

The folk theorem of repeated games has established that cooperative behavior can be sustained as an equilibrium in repeated settings. Early papers on private monitoring and a recent paper of Cole and Kocherlakota (Games and Economic Behavior, 53 [2005 ...
Wojciech Olszewski, Johannes Hörnerx
core   +1 more source