Results 81 to 90 of about 22,191 (172)

Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit [PDF]

We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player.s continuation strategy is optimal ...
Jeffery Ely, Johannes Horner, Wojciech Olszewski   +2 more
core  

Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem [PDF]

We provide game-theoretic foundations for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model of distributive politics.
John Duggan, Seok-ju Cho
core  

Four levers of reciprocity across human societies: concepts, analysis and predictions. [PDF]

Evol Hum Sci, 2022
Lehmann L, Powers ST, van Schaik CP.
europepmc   +1 more source

Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. [PDF]

This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982.
Tomala, Tristan
core  

Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games. [PDF]

Dyn Games Appl
Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Stability analysis of the coexistence equilibrium of a balanced metapopulation model. [PDF]

Sci Rep, 2021
Rao S, Muyinda N, De Baets B.
europepmc   +1 more source

"Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players" [PDF]

We investigate two-player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close to unity. Monitoring is private and players cannot communicate. We require no condition concerning the accuracy of players' monitoring technology.
Hitoshi Matsushima
core  

Mean Field Games and Ideal Free Distribution. [PDF]

J Math Biol
Cantrell RS, Cosner C, Lam KY, Mazari-Fouquer I.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Definable and Contractible Contracts [PDF]

This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their actions on the contracts of the other players. These contracts are required to be representable in a formal language.
Peters, Michael, Szentes, Balazs
core  

Categorizing music by genres. [PDF]

Ann N Y Acad Sci
Lange EB, Gernandt E, Merrill J.
europepmc   +1 more source