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Sequential Auctions and Auction Design [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010 Often an auction designer has the option of selling, or purchasing, those lots available in one auction or a sequence of auctions. In addition, bidder opportunities will not be static, in part due to arrival of information, but also because bidders can face deadlines for making decisions.
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The RAND Journal of Economics, 2022
AbstractWe study platform markets in which agents arrive gradually, experience changes to their preferences over time, and are frequently re‐matched. We introduce simple auctions specifically designed for such markets. Upon joining, agents select a status that determines the weight assigned to their future bids. Each match is then assigned a score that
Fershtman, Daniel, Pavan, Alessandro
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AbstractWe study platform markets in which agents arrive gradually, experience changes to their preferences over time, and are frequently re‐matched. We introduce simple auctions specifically designed for such markets. Upon joining, agents select a status that determines the weight assigned to their future bids. Each match is then assigned a score that
Fershtman, Daniel, Pavan, Alessandro
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ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2009
In this note we give a survey of bisection auctions. Bisection auctions have been introduced in order to reduce the number of rounds and increase privacy of information in iterative implementations of Vickrey auctions. First, we present the case of discrete valuations.
Herings, P.J.J. +2 more
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In this note we give a survey of bisection auctions. Bisection auctions have been introduced in order to reduce the number of rounds and increase privacy of information in iterative implementations of Vickrey auctions. First, we present the case of discrete valuations.
Herings, P.J.J. +2 more
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Auctions without Auctioneers: Distributed Auction Protocols
2000It is quite natural for electronic institutions to follow the structure of their physical counterparts. However, this is not always appropriate or desirable in a virtual setting. We report on the prototyping of an alternative architecture for electronic auctions based around the concept of an interagent and building on the considerable body of work in ...
Marc Esteva, Julian Padget
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, 2015 We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. The theory yields several empirically testable predictions concerning the strategic behavior of the agents, both under symmetric and asymmetric information.
Niedermayer, Andreas +2 more
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Management Science
Online advertising impressions are traded through a multitiered network of intermediaries. We model the revenue optimization of a publisher that auctions off advertising impressions to intermediary exchanges, which, in turn, run their own internal auctions among the advertisers they represent.
Robert Zeithammer, W. Jason Choi
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Online advertising impressions are traded through a multitiered network of intermediaries. We model the revenue optimization of a publisher that auctions off advertising impressions to intermediary exchanges, which, in turn, run their own internal auctions among the advertisers they represent.
Robert Zeithammer, W. Jason Choi
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European Economic Review, 1998 A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending- bid or a sealed-bid format. The critical distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders with information through the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It may stimulate competition by creating a reliable process of price discovery, by
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