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Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions [PDF]
, 2010 We argue that in order to achieve the VCG outcomes in combinatorial auctions, the auctioneer does not need to make a full contractual agreement on the protocol with participants. We can leave the detail of its design to the auctioneer's discretion. The auctioneer can even make it contingent on unverifiable information.
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The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response *
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