Results 231 to 240 of about 3,024 (267)
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
In a charity auction the public‐goods nature of auction revenue affects bidding incentives. We compare equilibrium bidding and revenue in first‐price, second‐price, and all‐pay charity auctions. Bidding revenue typically varies by selling format. First‐price auctions are less lucrative than second‐price and all‐pay auctions, and with sufficiently many ...
Maxim Engers, Brian McManus
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In a charity auction the public‐goods nature of auction revenue affects bidding incentives. We compare equilibrium bidding and revenue in first‐price, second‐price, and all‐pay charity auctions. Bidding revenue typically varies by selling format. First‐price auctions are less lucrative than second‐price and all‐pay auctions, and with sufficiently many ...
Maxim Engers, Brian McManus
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Economica, 1991
This paper studies a model of simultaneous sealed-bid multiobject auctions where the designated winner has the possibility of withdrawing his bid. It is shown that, when the bidders face rising marginal costs (a capacity constraint), the introduction of such a withdrawal option may lead to lower equilibrium prices. Furthermore, an increase in the slope
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This paper studies a model of simultaneous sealed-bid multiobject auctions where the designated winner has the possibility of withdrawing his bid. It is shown that, when the bidders face rising marginal costs (a capacity constraint), the introduction of such a withdrawal option may lead to lower equilibrium prices. Furthermore, an increase in the slope
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, 1987 This paper discusses two central questions: Why do auction institutions continue to be so popular after thousands of years? and What accounts for particular details, like the popularity of sealed bid and ascending-bid auctions?
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, 1996 The importance of auction theory has gained increased recognition in the scientific community, the latest recognition being the award of the Nobel price to Vickrey and Mirrlees. Auction theory has been used in quite different fields, both theoretically and empirically.
Boeheim, Rene, Zulehner, Christine
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How to design efficient renewable energy auctions? Empirical insights from Europe
Energy Policy, 2022Vasilios Anatolitis, Ann-Katrin Fleck
exaly
A review of multiunit auctions with homogeneous goods
Journal of Economic Surveys, 2022Peyman Khezr
exaly
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science, 1998Michael H Rothkopf +2 more
exaly