Results 41 to 50 of about 39,907 (130)
Decisions Under Radical Uncertainty: The Role of Volitional Liminality in Radical Innovation
Journal of Product Innovation Management, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Academic Summary Radical innovation management can be understood as an organizational practice that enacts distant futures, which are open‐ended and unknowable. Such radical innovation endeavors are thus characterized by radical uncertainty, where possible futures are not only quantitatively but qualitatively different from the present, and ...
José Antonio Rosa +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Towards a Coherent Theory of Physics and Mathematics [PDF]
, 2002 As an approach to a Theory of Everything a framework for developing a coherent theory of mathematics and physics together is described. The main characteristic of such a theory is discussed: the theory must be valid and and sufficiently strong, and it ...
Benioff, Paul
core +2 more sources
Taking Risks, With and Without Probabilities
Noûs, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Some hold that expected utility is too restrictive in the way it handles risk. Risk‐weighted expected utility is an alternative that allows decision‐makers to have a range of attitudes toward probabilistic risk. It holds that any attitude within this range is instrumentally rational, since these attitudes represent different, equally good ...
Lara Buchak
wiley +1 more source
Probabilistic and Geometric Languages in the Context of the Principle of Least Action [PDF]
, 2014 This paper explores the issue of the unification of three languages of physics, the geometric language of forces, geometric language of fields or 4-dimensional space-time, and probabilistic language of quantum mechanics.
Terekhovich, Vladislav
core
Noûs, EarlyView.ABSTRACT “Almost everyone,” Ronald Dworkin wrote in Sovereign Virtue, “assumes that democracy means equal voting power.” What, then, is voting power? The standard view defines it as the probability that a vote changes the outcome assuming that each possible combination of votes is equiprobable.
Daniel Wodak
wiley +1 more source
Anselm's Temporal‐Ontological Proof
Noûs, EarlyView.ABSTRACT In his Reply to Gaunilo, Anselm presented two additional arguments for the existence of God beyond those that appear in the Proslogion. In “The Logical Structure of Anselm's Argument,” Robert M. Adams isolates each. One, he develops into a modal ontological argument along the lines of other 20th century ontological arguments (e.g., those of ...
Daniel Rubio
wiley +1 more source
Track Record Arguments in Normative Ethics
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Track record arguments (TRAs) contend that it speaks in favor of an ethical theory (such as utilitarianism) if many of its past proponents had moral views that were controversial at their time but which we now consider to be clearly true (e.g., women's equal rights in 18th century Europe). This paper explores how to construct potentially sound
Leonard Dung
wiley +1 more source
The Abductivist Interpretation of Frege's Conception of Logic
Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Frege is an abductivist about logic. For him, an acceptable logic must be sufficient—that is, it must be able to explain the relevant data, such as the fact that arithmetical laws are logical truths. Thus, Frege's logicism is an abductive project aimed at establishing the acceptability of his logic, Begriffsschrift.
Junyeol Kim
wiley +1 more source
Simulations All the Way Up! An Atheist's Response to the Fine‐Tuning Argument
Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT So the Fine‐tuning Argument goes, because it is so unlikely for the physical constants of the laws of nature to have taken the values that they in fact take, we should significantly raise our credence that God exists. Simulation Arguments argue that our world might be (or, in stronger versions, that it probably is) a mere computer simulation ...
Nikk Effingham
wiley +1 more source
A Contextual Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT A central motivation for Probabilism—the principle of rationality that requires one to have credences that satisfy the axioms of probability—is the accuracy dominance argument: one should not have accuracy dominated credences, and one avoids accuracy dominance just in case one satisfies Probabilism.
Mikayla Kelley
wiley +1 more source