Results 191 to 200 of about 48,707 (241)
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Feng Dong, Zhiwei Xu
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Feng Dong, Zhiwei Xu
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Despite the cogent criticism that "bailing out" insolvent firms creates moral hazard, bailouts often occur in the aftermath of bank runs and other financial crises. In an environment where it is economically efficient to make illiquid investments, and where investors have private information regarding their respective liquidity risks, the investment ...
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2020
"En période de forte incertitude, les gouvernements interviennent souvent en adoptant des mesures telles que le renflouement des institutions financières. Pour utiliser efficacement les ressources publiques et éviter des répercussions majeures sur le reste de l’économie, les décideurs tentent d’établir quelles institutions devraient recevoir de l’aide.
Ahnert, Toni +2 more
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"En période de forte incertitude, les gouvernements interviennent souvent en adoptant des mesures telles que le renflouement des institutions financières. Pour utiliser efficacement les ressources publiques et éviter des répercussions majeures sur le reste de l’économie, les décideurs tentent d’établir quelles institutions devraient recevoir de l’aide.
Ahnert, Toni +2 more
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This paper studies with disaggregated budget data how expenditures, revenues, and borrowing evolve in municipalities that receive bailouts. It asks whether higher-level governments enforce austerity measures after bailing out indebted municipalities.
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2018
Empirical evidence suggests that managerial overconfidence and government guarantees contribute substantially to excessive risk-taking in the banking industry. This paper incorporates managerial overconfidence and limited bank liability into a principal-agent model, where the bank manager unobservably chooses effort and risk.
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Empirical evidence suggests that managerial overconfidence and government guarantees contribute substantially to excessive risk-taking in the banking industry. This paper incorporates managerial overconfidence and limited bank liability into a principal-agent model, where the bank manager unobservably chooses effort and risk.
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Journal of Financial Stability, 2022
This paper analyzes the evolution of Milton Friedman’s thinking about bailouts. It covers bailouts of commercial banks, shadow banks and other financial firms, manufacturing firms, governments, financial markets, and other cases where the term is commonly used.
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This paper analyzes the evolution of Milton Friedman’s thinking about bailouts. It covers bailouts of commercial banks, shadow banks and other financial firms, manufacturing firms, governments, financial markets, and other cases where the term is commonly used.
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
Abstract On March 16, 2013, Cyprus announced that it would accept a bailout that required imposing a one-time levy on bank deposits. It has been argued that, by making traditional deposit accounts seem less secure, the bailout announcement prompted some to consider—or reconsider—using the cryptocurrency bitcoin.
William J. Luther, Alexander W. Salter
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Abstract On March 16, 2013, Cyprus announced that it would accept a bailout that required imposing a one-time levy on bank deposits. It has been argued that, by making traditional deposit accounts seem less secure, the bailout announcement prompted some to consider—or reconsider—using the cryptocurrency bitcoin.
William J. Luther, Alexander W. Salter
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We extend the standard Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) sovereign default model to study bailout policies. In our setup a country that concentrates a significant fraction of bond holders decide on a period by period basis whether to bailout a debtor government.
Leonardo Martinez +3 more
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2021
What is the best macroprudential regulation when households differ in their exposure to profits from the financial sector? To answer the question, I study a real business cycle model with household heterogeneity and market incompleteness. In the model, shocks are amplified in states with high leverage, leading to lower investment.
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What is the best macroprudential regulation when households differ in their exposure to profits from the financial sector? To answer the question, I study a real business cycle model with household heterogeneity and market incompleteness. In the model, shocks are amplified in states with high leverage, leading to lower investment.
openaire +1 more source

