Results 261 to 270 of about 123,435 (317)
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Games and Economic Behavior, 2002
The author studies a multiperson bargaining problem described in the form of the following Shaked's game: There are \(n\geq 2\) bargainers (players). In each period \(t=1,2,\dots\) , player \(i=t\pmod n\) submits a nonnegative vector proposal \(x_t = (x_t^1,x_t^2,\dots , x_t^n)\) satisfying \(\sum_{j=1}^n x_t^j =1\).
Albert Burgos +2 more
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The author studies a multiperson bargaining problem described in the form of the following Shaked's game: There are \(n\geq 2\) bargainers (players). In each period \(t=1,2,\dots\) , player \(i=t\pmod n\) submits a nonnegative vector proposal \(x_t = (x_t^1,x_t^2,\dots , x_t^n)\) satisfying \(\sum_{j=1}^n x_t^j =1\).
Albert Burgos +2 more
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, 2008 This article is a survey on bargaining theory. The focus is the game theoretic approach to bargaining, both on its axiomatic and strategic counterparts. The application of bargaining theory to large markets and its connections with competitive allocations are also discussed.
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Bargaining and Bargaining Games
2020In this chapter, after specifying the bargaining problem a la Nash (1950), the Rubinstein game and its subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium are presented. The equilibrium is determined (1) by the shrinking of the cake to be distributed among the two players and (2) by how the shrinking is evaluated by the players.
Manfred J. Holler, Barbara Klose-Ullmann
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Bargaining power in crisis bargaining
Review of Economic Design, 2023zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007 When buyers choose the order in which they bargain with suppliers of known characteristics, prices are determined jointly by bargaining power and competitive intensity (the outside option to bargain with rival suppliers). Bargaining power becomes less important to the outcome as competition intensifies; prices fall to marginal cost in the limit.
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Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1989
The problem of specifying the empirical conditions of, and prescriptive guidelines for, conflict resolution in deeply divided societies such as South Africa presents a challenge to both political theorists and public policy makers. The aim of this article is to assess the prospects for conflict resolution in South Africa by evaluating two divergent ...
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The problem of specifying the empirical conditions of, and prescriptive guidelines for, conflict resolution in deeply divided societies such as South Africa presents a challenge to both political theorists and public policy makers. The aim of this article is to assess the prospects for conflict resolution in South Africa by evaluating two divergent ...
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Games and Economic Behavior, 2002
Given any two-person economy, we consider a simple alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information where the agents offer prices. We provide conditions under which the outcomes of all stationary subgame-perfect equilibria converge to the Walrasian equilibrium (the price and the allocation) as the agents become infinitely patient ...
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Given any two-person economy, we consider a simple alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information where the agents offer prices. We provide conditions under which the outcomes of all stationary subgame-perfect equilibria converge to the Walrasian equilibrium (the price and the allocation) as the agents become infinitely patient ...
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Public Choice, 2010 Is there a bargaining equilibrium comparable to the equilibrium in the competitive economy? The claim in this paper is that there is not. Bargaining models with well-specified equilibria have been built upon a shared sense of what is fair, concessions in proportion to harm from failure to agree or an imposed bargaining procedure.
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Bargaining Order in a Multi-Person Bargaining Game [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2010 This paper studies a bargaining game with one buyer and multiple sellers of different "sizes" or bargaining strengths. The bargaining order is determined by the buyer. If the buyer can commit to a bargaining order, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome where the buyer bargains in order of increasing size -- from the smallest to the ...
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Management Science, 2015
A retailer’s assortment decision results from a process of give-and-take, during which the retailer may bid manufacturers against one another, and the terms of trade offer plenty of flexibility for allocating the profit among the retailer and manufacturers. We adopt a bargaining framework to capture such an assortment selection process. We investigate
Göker Aydin, H. Sebastian Heese
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A retailer’s assortment decision results from a process of give-and-take, during which the retailer may bid manufacturers against one another, and the terms of trade offer plenty of flexibility for allocating the profit among the retailer and manufacturers. We adopt a bargaining framework to capture such an assortment selection process. We investigate
Göker Aydin, H. Sebastian Heese
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