Results 101 to 110 of about 109,982 (168)
The bargaining set in strategic market games [PDF]
We present the bargaining set of an economy, where trades among groups of individuals are conducted via the Shapley-Shubik mechanism. Then we prove that in atomless economies the allocations resulting from this equilibrium notion are competitive ...
Nicholas Ziros
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Bargaining with an Agenda [PDF]
We propose a new framework for bargaining in which the process follows an agenda. The agenda is represented by a family, parameterized by time, of increasing sets of joint utilities for possible agreements.
Dov Samet +3 more
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China's Potential Future Growth and Gains from Trade Policy Bargaining: Some Numerical Simulation Results [PDF]
Numerical simulation analysis of bargaining solutions is little developed in existing literature. Here we use a multi country, single period numerical general equilibrium model which captures China and her major trading partners and examine the outcomes ...
Chunding Li, John Whalley
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Bargaining and Bargaining Sets [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra
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Econometrica, 1996 Summary: We present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among \(n\) participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case,
Hart, Sergiu, Mas-Colell, Andreu
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Bargaining with an agenda [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Barry O'Neill +3 more
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The Journal of Socio-Economics, 2007
“As-if bargaining” claims that ultimatum demands and demands in the Nash demand game are analogously derived and are therefore similar to each other. By comparing experimentally the ultimatum and the Nash demand game with varying conflict payoffs we try to assess the empirical validity of this hypothesis.
Fischer, S., Güth, W., Pull, K.
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“As-if bargaining” claims that ultimatum demands and demands in the Nash demand game are analogously derived and are therefore similar to each other. By comparing experimentally the ultimatum and the Nash demand game with varying conflict payoffs we try to assess the empirical validity of this hypothesis.
Fischer, S., Güth, W., Pull, K.
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Games and Economic Behavior, 2022
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation).
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I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation).
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Games and Economic Behavior, 2002
The author studies a multiperson bargaining problem described in the form of the following Shaked's game: There are \(n\geq 2\) bargainers (players). In each period \(t=1,2,\dots\) , player \(i=t\pmod n\) submits a nonnegative vector proposal \(x_t = (x_t^1,x_t^2,\dots , x_t^n)\) satisfying \(\sum_{j=1}^n x_t^j =1\).
Albert Burgos +2 more
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The author studies a multiperson bargaining problem described in the form of the following Shaked's game: There are \(n\geq 2\) bargainers (players). In each period \(t=1,2,\dots\) , player \(i=t\pmod n\) submits a nonnegative vector proposal \(x_t = (x_t^1,x_t^2,\dots , x_t^n)\) satisfying \(\sum_{j=1}^n x_t^j =1\).
Albert Burgos +2 more
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, 2008 This article is a survey on bargaining theory. The focus is the game theoretic approach to bargaining, both on its axiomatic and strategic counterparts. The application of bargaining theory to large markets and its connections with competitive allocations are also discussed.
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