Results 211 to 220 of about 14,257 (269)
Strategic purchasing of oncology drugs to improve affordability and access to cancer care in India. [PDF]
Lancet Reg Health Southeast AsiaChokshi M, Garg O.
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Enhancing Women's Financial Empowerment through Savings Strategies: Evidence from MAMIDECOT, Masaka District, Uganda. [PDF]
F1000ResEseza N, David Ongabi N, Andrew N.
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Bargaining and Bargaining Sets [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2002 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra
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Econometrica, 1996 Summary: We present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among \(n\) participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case,
Hart, Sergiu, Mas-Colell, Andreu
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Bargaining with an agenda [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Barry O'Neill +3 more
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The Journal of Socio-Economics, 2007
“As-if bargaining” claims that ultimatum demands and demands in the Nash demand game are analogously derived and are therefore similar to each other. By comparing experimentally the ultimatum and the Nash demand game with varying conflict payoffs we try to assess the empirical validity of this hypothesis.
Fischer, S., Güth, W., Pull, K.
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“As-if bargaining” claims that ultimatum demands and demands in the Nash demand game are analogously derived and are therefore similar to each other. By comparing experimentally the ultimatum and the Nash demand game with varying conflict payoffs we try to assess the empirical validity of this hypothesis.
Fischer, S., Güth, W., Pull, K.
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Games and Economic Behavior, 2022
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation).
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I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation).
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Games and Economic Behavior, 2002
The author studies a multiperson bargaining problem described in the form of the following Shaked's game: There are \(n\geq 2\) bargainers (players). In each period \(t=1,2,\dots\) , player \(i=t\pmod n\) submits a nonnegative vector proposal \(x_t = (x_t^1,x_t^2,\dots , x_t^n)\) satisfying \(\sum_{j=1}^n x_t^j =1\).
Albert Burgos +2 more
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The author studies a multiperson bargaining problem described in the form of the following Shaked's game: There are \(n\geq 2\) bargainers (players). In each period \(t=1,2,\dots\) , player \(i=t\pmod n\) submits a nonnegative vector proposal \(x_t = (x_t^1,x_t^2,\dots , x_t^n)\) satisfying \(\sum_{j=1}^n x_t^j =1\).
Albert Burgos +2 more
openaire +2 more sources