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Many unions in the United States have for several years engaged in what is known as pattern bargaining. In this article, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous industry‐wide negotiations and sequential negotiations without a pattern. Allowing for interfirm productivity differentials within an industry, we show that
Robert Marshall, Antonio Merlo
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A Simple Mechanism Causing Wealth Concentration
We study mechanisms leading to wealth condensation. As a natural starting point, our model adopts a neoclassical point of view, i.e., we completely ignore work, production, and productive relations, and focus only on bilateral link between two randomly ...
Michał Cieśla, Małgorzata Snarska
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Hart, Sergiu, Mas-Colell, Andreu
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Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups ...
Daniel Augusto Motta
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Learning and Applying Cooperative Solutions: A Classroom Experiment on Transportation Games
In a trade experiment, groups of students were taught how to bargain over a pie generated in a transportation game. Data collection and detailed group reports of the bargaining process allowed us to identify the type of bargaining followed and its ...
Nikolaos Georgantzis +2 more
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On gamesmen and fair men: explaining fairness in non-cooperative bargaining games [PDF]
Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction, and that they only rarely make demands in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Ramzi Suleiman
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Price and Quantity Competition under Vertical Pricing
We consider a vertically related market where one quantity-setting and another price-setting downstream firm negotiate the terms of a two-part tariff contract with an upstream input supplier.
Debasmita Basak
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Bargaining with confirmed proposals: an experimental analysis of tacit collusion in Cournot and Bertrand duopolies [PDF]
In this paper, we investigate theoretically and experimentally the performances of a bargaining over strategies protocol with confirmed proposal, with either symmetric or asymmetric power of confirmation. We apply it both on a Bertrand duopoly market, in
Manzoni, Elena
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Rural women's access to land is fundamental for their individual and household well-being, equity, and empowerment. In Mexico, the agrarian reform of 1992 and customary gendered rights shaped land use, access, and control.
Jozelin María Soto-Alarcón +1 more
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Equilibrium in a Bargaining Game of Two Sellers and Two Buyers
The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing bargaining theory from general real world applications.
Jiawei Li, Tianxiang Cui, Graham Kendall
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