Results 161 to 170 of about 1,936,579 (173)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Belief Change on Rational Rankings
Proceedings of the TwentyFirst International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and ReasoningWe introduce a new epistemic space: the space of rational rankings. This space is very useful for understanding some aspects of belief dynamics. In particular, the issues which concern improving the new information. Thus, we define in a very clear and succinct way a class of operators capturing the fact that the new information is improved.
Nerio Borges +3 more
openaire +1 more source
A Computational Approach for Belief Change
2005In this paper, we combine the syntax-based belief change approach and model-based approach, and present a computational approach for belief change. We introduce functions to revise or contract a belief set, as well as functions to revise or contract a belief base. We also show properties of the revision functions and the contraction functions.
Shangmin Luan, Guozhong Dai
openaire +1 more source
Change of belief or change of meaning?
1973I should like to begin by noting that while I regard it as a considerable privilege that I should be addressing you at all this evening, it is to me a still greater one that I should be addressing you first rather than second. This is an order of speakers quite the reverse of what the printed program might have led you to suspect, and I want to comment
openaire +1 more source
Knowledge Compilation for Belief Change
2006Techniques for knowledge compilation like prime implicates and binary decision diagrams (BDDs) are effective methods for improving the practical efficiency of reasoning tasks. In this paper we provide a construction for a belief contraction operator using prime implicates.
openaire +1 more source
Agent Communication and Belief Change
2015The notion of multi-agents, including the communication between them, is one of the most fundamental issues to be formalized in artificia intelligence. The communication, however, is not a simple message passing. First, a rational agent should send logically consistent contents in the situation; or, he/she could be an intentional liar.
openaire +1 more source