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Auditor independence and the new independence standards board
Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 1998AbstractIn search of additional fees, big accounting firms now offer “extended” audit services to corporate clients, including both external and internal audit functions. But there have been no new guidelines to keep auditors independent and truly impartial. However, that may soon change.
Robert W. Rouse, Gary Previts
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Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of 'Independent' Directors [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009 We provide evidence that firms appoint independent directors who are overly sympathetic to management, while still technically independent according to regulatory definitions. We explore a subset of independent directors for whom we have detailed, microlevel data on their views regarding the firm prior to being appointed to the board: sell-side ...
Lauren Cohen +2 more
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Board Independence and Audit-Firm Type
AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 1998This paper investigates the role of outside members of the board of directors in the choice of external auditor for property-liability insurance companies. Consistent with our hypothesis that we derive from theories of both corporate governance and audit quality, we find that the likelihood of an insurer employing a brand name auditor that specializes ...
Mark S. Beasley, Kathy R. Petroni
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Non-GAAP earnings and board independence
Review of Accounting Studies, 2010We examine the association between board independence and the characteristics of non-GAAP earnings. Our results suggest that companies with less independent boards are more likely to opportunistically exclude recurring items from non-GAAP earnings. Specifically, we find that exclusions from non-GAAP earnings have a greater association with future GAAP ...
Richard M. Frankel +2 more
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The Independent Board as Shield
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019The fiduciary duty of loyalty bars CEOs and other executives from managing companies for personal gain. In the modern public corporation, this restriction is reinforced by a pair of institutions: the independent board of directors and the business judgment rule.
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
Worldwide, the presence of independent directors on the board of listed companies is seen as an integral element of a company’s corporate governance process and has become a pre requisite for good governance. Consequently, in the recent years, governance reforms in India have increasingly pinned hope, as well as responsibility, on independent directors
Santosh Pande, Valeed Ahmad Ansari
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Worldwide, the presence of independent directors on the board of listed companies is seen as an integral element of a company’s corporate governance process and has become a pre requisite for good governance. Consequently, in the recent years, governance reforms in India have increasingly pinned hope, as well as responsibility, on independent directors
Santosh Pande, Valeed Ahmad Ansari
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The Costs of a (Nearly) Fully Independent Board
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Abstract A significant and growing percentage of U.S. firms now have boards where the CEO is the only employee director (hereinafter fully independent boards). This paper studies whether and how this practice impacts board effectiveness. I find that fully independent boards are associated with a significant reduction in firm performance.
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The Vascular Surgery Board of the American Board of Surgery: Our Independent Board
Annals of Vascular Surgery, 2022Thomas S, Huber, Edward R, Woodward
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Board Independence and CEO Incentives
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008Contrary to a commonly-held view in the corporate governance literature, I argue theoretically that the optimal pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) should be smaller in the presence of board monitoring for a risk-averse CEO. My model is based on a simple adaptation of Holmstrom and Milgrom (Econometrica 1987).
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Gray Boards: Revealed Board Non-Independence
2018How do investors learn about de facto board non-independence when formal majority independence is close to universal? I develop a signaling model in which the first overt non-independent appointment is a last-resort action that reveals depleted concealment options, and in which a proxy-advisor classification layer surfaces conflicts that firm ...
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