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Harry Frankfurt characterised bullshit as assertions that are made without a concern for truth. Assertions, however, are not the only type of speech act that can be bullshit.
José Ángel Gascón
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Individual Differences in Receptivity to Scientific Bullshit [PDF]
Pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity is the tendency to perceive meaning in important-sounding, nonsense statements. To understand how bullshit receptivity differs across domains, we develop a scale to measure scientific bullshit receptivity — the ...
Willem Sleegers +2 more
exaly +4 more sources
Political Bullshit Receptivity and Its Correlates: A Cross-Country Validation of the Concept
Philosophers conceptualized bullshit as persuasive communication that has no regard for truth, knowledge, or evidence. In psychology, research mostly investigated pseudo-profound bullshit, but no study has examined bullshit in the political context.
Bertjan Doosje
exaly +3 more sources
On the Reception and Detection of Pseudo-Profound Bullshit [PDF]
Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from philosophers, its reception (critical or ingenuous) has not, to our knowledge, been subject to empirical investigation.
Derek J. Koehler +2 more
exaly +4 more sources
Are Neoliberals More Susceptible to Bullshit? [PDF]
We conducted additional analyses of Pennycook et al.’s (2015, Study 2) data to investigate the possibility that there would be ideological differences in “bullshit receptivity” that would be explained by individual differences in cognitive style and ...
John T. Jost, Gordon Pennycook
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Abstract Recently, there has been considerable interest in large language models: machine learning systems which produce human-like text and dialogue. Applications of these systems have been plagued by persistent inaccuracies in their output; these are often called “AI hallucinations”.
Michael Townsen Hicks
exaly +3 more sources
Bullshit for You; Transcendence for Me. A Commentary on “on the Reception and Detection of Pseudo-Profound Bullshit” [PDF]
In reply to Dalton (2016), we argue that bullshit is defined in terms of how it is produced, not how it is interpreted. We agree that it can be interpreted as profound by some readers (and assumed as much in the original paper).
Craig Dalton
exaly +1 more source
It’s Still Bullshit: Reply to Dalton (2016) [PDF]
I raise a methodological concern regarding the study performed by Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler and Fugelsang (2015), in which they used randomly generated, but syntactically correct, statements that were rated for profundity by subjects unaware of ...
Derek J. Koehler +2 more
exaly +1 more source
Deeper into Argumentative Bullshit
In a recent paper, José Ángel Gascón extends the Frankfurtian notion of bullshit to the sphere of argumentation. On Frankfurt’s view, the hallmark of bullshit is a lack of concern for the truth of an utterance on the part of the bullshitter.
Nikil Mukerji, Adriano Mannino
doaj +1 more source

