Results 261 to 270 of about 262,247 (303)
This chapter surveys the sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to jointly determine their actions. The defining idea of a coalition, in this chapter, is that of a group which can coordinate agreements among its members, while it ...
Debraj Ray, Rajiv Vohra
openaire +2 more sources
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
Subgame Perfect Coalition Formation
Dynamic Games and Applications, 2022zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Greg Leo +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
Econometrica, 1983THE FORMATION OF COALITIONS is a fundamental problem in game theory. By a "coalition" is meant a group of "players" (e.g., economic or political agents) which decide to act together, as one unit, relative to the rest of the players. This includes the instances of syndicates, unions, cartels, blocks, political parties, parliamentary coalitions, etc.
Hart, Sergiu, Kurz, Mordecai
openaire +2 more sources
Growth and Coalition Formation [PDF]
In this paper we analyse a growth model where agents have different factor endowments and form coalitions to produce output. Economic growth is the result of the accumulation of human capital. The latter in turn is a by-product of the production activity within a coalition. The maximum rate of growth is obtained when the grand coalition forms. However,
FIASCHI, DAVIDE, PACINI, PIER MARIO
openaire +3 more sources
Coalition formation problems with externalities
Economics Letters, 2022zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
María Haydée Fonseca-Mairena +1 more
openaire +3 more sources
Encouraging a coalition formation [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +1 more source
Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation
Econometrica, 1986Summary: We consider an economy in which agents may or may not communicate with each other. Coalitions can form only between linked agents. We consider two cases: agents must communicate directly to be in the same coalition or in the second case indirectly. We consider the communication to be random.
Kirman, Alan P +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Corrigendum to “On coalition formation: durable coalition structures”
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2003zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Barberà, Salvador, Gerber, Anke
openaire +2 more sources

