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Strong Players and Stable Coalition Structures in PMAS Profit Game
In a non-negative profit game that possesses a Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme (PMAS), being a member of a larger coalition implies that your profit cannot decrease. In this paper, we refer to such games as PMAS profit games.
Ana Meca, Greys Sošić
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Optimisation for Coalitions Formation Considering the Fairness in Flexibility Market Participation [PDF]
This paper proposes a coalitional game-theoretical model for consumers’ flexibility coalition formation, supported by an optimization model based on differential evolution.
Faia Ricardo +4 more
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We propose Anchored Team Formation Games (ATFGs), a new class of hedonic game inspired by tabletop role playing games.We establish the NP-hardness of determining whether Nash stable coalition structures exist, and provide results for three heuristics for
Jacob Schlueter +2 more
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On coalition formation: durable coalition structures [PDF]
A hedonic game consists of a finite set of players and, for each one of them, a preference relation (complete preordering) on the set of coalitions to which the player belongs. The concept is hereditary for subsets of players. A coalition structure (CS, in the sequel) is a partition of the player set.
Salvador Barberà, Anke Gerber
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Coalition structure generation: A survey [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Talal Rahwan +3 more
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The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
László Á. Kóczy, Luc Lauwers
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Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there ...
Vincent Vannetelbosch +2 more
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A Bargaining Solution With Level Structure
Presently, a conventional coalition structure can no more cover all the types of cooperative structures in practice, external cooperation between the coalitions also affects the payoff allocation between the participants.
Xiao Yan, Li Dengfeng
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A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures [PDF]
Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game.
Ray, Debraj, Vohra, Rajiv
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Background Community coalitions are rooted in complex and dynamic community systems. Despite recognition that environmental factors affect coalition behavior, few studies have examined how community context impacts coalition formation.
Honeycutt Sally +2 more
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