Results 131 to 140 of about 144,353 (287)
Incentives for Process Innovation in a Collusive Duopoly [PDF]
Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the second period, they will be able to collude. Gains from collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution.
Christoph Engel
core
On the sustainability of collusion in Bertrand supergames with discrete pricing and nonlinear demand [PDF]
In traditional industrial organization models of Bertrand supergames, the critical discount factor governing the sustainability of collusion is independent of key demand and supply parameters.
Zimmerman, Paul R.
core +1 more source
Two Regimes of Waste and Value: ‘Post‐Disaster’ Landscapes in a New India
Development and Change, EarlyView.ABSTRACT In this age of ‘disaster capitalism’, catastrophes are neither ‘natural’ nor ‘external’. They are political events mediating and vitally shaping the unequal and exploitative use of environmental resources. India's ‘post‐disaster’ landscapes at the turn of the new millennium powerfully demonstrate how visions of the new‐normal can be imposed in
Vasudha Chhotray, David Singh
wiley +1 more source
The Politics of Detailed Urban Planning: Institutional Change and Urban Rentiership in Madagascar
Development and Change, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This article employs a political settlements approach to explore the formal and informal institutional dynamics that underpin contemporary rentier capitalism in urban Africa through the case of Antananarivo, Madagascar. It examines how Malagasy ruling elites created opportunities for land‐based rent seeking by establishing new institutional ...
Fanny Voélin
wiley +1 more source
Why is competition in the European football market failing, and what should be done about it?
Economic Affairs, EarlyView.Abstract The European football (soccer) market increasingly funnels rents to superstar players and intermediaries while weakening competitive balance. We trace this dynamic to two forces: (a) technological innovation that globalised broadcasting and magnified superstar returns, and (b) legal rulings boosting player mobility and causing bidding wars ...
Magnus Henrekson, Lars Persson
wiley +1 more source
Second-Hand Markets and Collusion byManufacturers of Semidurable Goods [PDF]
The focus of the present work is to study the impact of the second-hand market the collusivebehavior. I analyze firms' preferences for having an active second-hand market and whetherpolicies (i.e. leasing policy, buy-back policy and warranty policy) that
Pasquale Schiraldi
core
Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, EarlyView.ABSTRACT The evolution of institutions in selecting government officials in ancient China reflected efficiency considerations and increased power concentration in the hands of the ruler. Selecting government officials in ancient China became more rule‐based over time, and standardisation and centralisation were some key features of this process.
Haiwen Zhou
wiley +1 more source
Incentives under collusion in a two-agent hidden-action model of a financial enterprize [PDF]
, 2005 This study analyzes collusion in an enterprize in which concerns about hedging cannot be ignored. In our two-agent single-task hidden-action model, where all the parties involved have exponential utility functions and the principal owning normally ...
Barlo, Mehmet +2 more
core
The Spillover Effect of Media Ownership on Mainstream Media Discourse
Financial Management, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This article investigates the spillover effect of a firm's media ownership on reporting by unaffiliated mainstream media outlets, using a sample of Chinese publicly listed firms. We find that firms with ownership stakes in media companies receive more coverage and more positive tones from unaffiliated mainstream media outlets than other firms ...
Xin Yu, Shijun Guo, Robert Faff
wiley +1 more source