Results 141 to 150 of about 21,175 (300)
Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Auction Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India [PDF]
This paper undertakes structural estimation of asymmetric auction models in a market for basmati, and detects the presence of a cartel consisting of a large (in market share) local miller and commission agents purchasing for large distant millers.
A. BANERJI, J. V. MEENAKSHI
core
Local Elites in Chile's Pisco Valley: Dispossession, Legal Mobilisation and Intertwined Citizenship
Journal of Agrarian Change, EarlyView.ABSTRACT In countries in the Global South, citizenship is often closely tied to access to water and land ownership. In Latin America, the literature has primarily explored social mobilisation and identity reconfiguration in response to development‐driven processes of land and water dispossession affecting peasants, rural and Indigenous communities ...
Chloé Nicolas‐Artero
wiley +1 more source
Disentangling Inequality and Exploitation in the Rice Value Chain in Northern Uganda
Journal of Agrarian Change, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Although inequality between actors in agricultural value chains has been extensively studied, informal and semiformal arrangements in domestic value chains involving small‐scale actors have been explored less than formal arrangements involving large firms.
Malin J. Nystrand
wiley +1 more source
Journal of Agrarian Change, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This article examines how long‐standing local conflicts concerning the nature of common property, the distribution of access and administrative rights associated with it, and more broadly the nature of the community and the forms of citizenship that organise its governance shape demands for justice regarding land transfers to outside investors
Eric Léonard +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Detecting Informed Trading Risk from Undercutting Activity
The Journal of Finance, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We introduce a simple measure of informed trading risk, QIDres$QID^{res}$, the residual to liquidity quote‐improvement‐to‐deterioration ratio times −1$-1$. When facing with increased informed trading risk, liquidity providers compete less to provide liquidity, reducing their undercutting activity. Reductions in undercutting leave footprints in
YASHAR H. BARARDEHI +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts
The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims.
Jay Pil Choi
wiley +1 more source
When AI Colludes: Clinical Reliability of Training and Preference Data as a Trustworthy-AI Criterion. [PDF]
JMIR Ment HealthTahseen H.
europepmc +1 more source
Auction design in the presence of collusion
We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for extracting payments
Pavlov, Gregory
core
Does cartel leadership facilitate collusion? [PDF]
We discuss the implications of a Stackelberg sequence of play between a cartel and the fringe. We consider two different approaches to collusion: (i) one-stage static model and (ii) a multi-period oligopoly model.
Marc Escrihuela-Villar
core
Theorizing Waste as a Technique of Power in Capitalistic Stakeholder Relations
Journal of Management Studies, EarlyView.Abstract Waste is an important socio‐ecological challenge of contemporary capitalism, contributing to climate change and environmental degradation. Despite its pervasiveness and its impacts on diverse stakeholders, it yet remains largely underexplored in management and organization studies.
Elise Lobbedez +2 more
wiley +1 more source