Results 131 to 140 of about 28,810 (302)
Collusion with secret price cuts: an experimental investigation [PDF]
Theoretical work starting with Stigler (1964) suggests that collusion may be difficult to sustain in a repeated game with secret price cuts and demand uncertainty.
Robert Feinberg, Christopher Snyder
core
Significant Far‐Right Challenges to Australian Society? The XYZ and AustraliaOne
ABSTRACT Scholars who analyse the Australian far‐right from a criminological or security studies perspective propose that activists and groups pose ‘political’ challenges to Australian society. This paper examines the far‐right news website The XYZ and the AustraliaOne political party, and argues that claims that the far‐right may normalise ...
Timothy Lynch
wiley +1 more source
Seeing like a citizen: Experimental evidence on how empowerment affects engagement with the state
Abstract Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low‐income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state or forego engaging with the state altogether due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to
Soeren J. Henn +4 more
wiley +1 more source
The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa
Abstract How—and with whom—do rulers share power? Existing research focuses on the strategic logic of powersharing. In this paper, we analyze its economic foundations. Powersharing is modeled as a subnational fiscal contract, in which rulers allocate political representation based on constituencies’ revenue potential. Empirically, we combine historical
Yannick I. Pengl, Philip Roessler
wiley +1 more source
Collusion and Commitment in Bank Bailout [PDF]
Collusion and soft budget constraint are two conspicuous phenomena in transition economies¡¯ banking system. Literature has separately investigated those two phenomena from theoretical point of views.
Yanhua ZHANG
core
Abstract This paper develops a two‐period model to investigate how fiscal and bureaucratic asymmetries shape yardstick competition (YC), inter‐municipal cooperation (IMC), and rent‐seeking in local public service provision. Unlike previous approaches, we allow incumbents to invest in bureaucratic efficiency, influencing both service quality and ...
Antonio Cortese +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Stochastic Market Sharing, Partial Communication and Collusion [PDF]
This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive an imperfect private signal of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market
Heiko Gerlach
core +2 more sources
Welfare-Enhancing Collusion in the Presence of a Competitive Fringe [PDF]
Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a few large firms and a competitive fringe of many small suppliers choosing quantities in an infinite-horizon setting subject to demand shocks.
Juan Ignacio Guzmán, Juan-Pablo Montero
core
ABSTRACT Can AI‐driven capitalism sustain the moral preconditions of market order? We stage a dialogue between Adam Smith and a steel‐manned “EconAI” to test four Moral‐Market‐Fitness criteria: trustworthiness, fairness, non‐domination, and contestability, across 11 dilemmas.
Alexandra‐Codruța Bîzoi +1 more
wiley +1 more source

