Results 31 to 40 of about 2,134 (187)

Manipulation cases in free will and moral responsibility, part 2: Manipulator-focused responses. [PDF]

open access: yesPhilos Compass
Abstract In this paper—Part 2 of 3—we discuss one of the two main types of soft‐line responses to manipulation cases, which we refer to as manipulator‐focused views. Manipulator‐focused views hold, roughly, that the reason that Victim lacks responsibility (or lacks full responsibility) is because of the way the action is related to the Manipulator ...
De Marco G, Cyr TW.
europepmc   +2 more sources

Upcycling of semicrystalline polymers by compatibilization: mechanism and location of compatibilizers

open access: yesRSC Advances, 2022
Comparing the effect of a compatibilizer on the crystallinity of a semicrystalline polymer blend and its individual components is a facile way to predict the location and morphology of the compatibilizer.
Xiaomin Tang   +10 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples.
Schlosser, Markus E.
core   +3 more sources

Is Agentive Freedom a Secondary Quality?

open access: yesHumana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2022
The notion of a secondary property is usefully construed this way: sensory-perceptual experiences that present apparent instantiations of such a quality have intentional content—presentational content—that is systematically non-veridical, because the ...
Terence Horgan, Mark Timmons
doaj  

A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will

open access: yesRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2017
This article critically examines central arguments made in Sam Harris’ Free Will as well as key aspects of Daniel Dennett’s compatibilist conception of free will.
John Lemos
doaj   +1 more source

Stoicism and Frankfurtian Compatibilism

open access: yesElpis, 2018
Although the free will debate of contemporary analytic philosophy lacks almost any kind of historical perspective, some scholars (for instance Zimmerman 2000; Salles 2001, 2005) have pointed out a striking similarity between Stoic approaches to free ...
László Bernáth
doaj   +1 more source

Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is
Nichols, Shaun   +3 more
core   +4 more sources

The Christological Case for Compatibilism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2021
This work is embargoed by the author until 12/06/2023.Classical Christology entails compatibilism. In other words, that freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism is a necessary consequence of the teaching about Jesus Christ found ...
Johnson, Randall
core  

Daniel Dennett’s and Sam Harris’ Confrontation on the Problem of Free Will [PDF]

open access: yesPizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī, 2020
This paper seeks to explain and evaluate, by an analytic method, the conflict between determinism and free will from the viewpoint of two physicalist reductionist philosophers, namely, Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris. Dennett is a compatibilist philosopher
zahra khazaei   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

PSR, Modal Collapse, and Open Future in Ibn Sīnā's Philosophy

open access: yesTheoria, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT It has been contended that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) implies necessitarianism—that is, the view that everything occurs out of necessity. Discussing a well‐known argument for this claim developed by contemporary metaphysicians, I show that Ibn Sīnā has anticipated a counterpart of this argument, and that is precisely why he is ...
Mohammad Saleh Zarepour
wiley   +1 more source

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