Results 41 to 50 of about 2,134 (187)

Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom

open access: yesRevista de Filosofia, 2016
the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept.
Edgar Maraguat
doaj   +1 more source

Deflating and Debunking: A Case for Hard‐Line Structuralism

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 113, Issue 1, Page 169-181, July 2026.
ABSTRACT Can manipulated agents be morally responsible for what they do? According to hard‐line structuralism, yes. On this view, manipulated agents are responsible in virtue of satisfying the relevant structural conditions taken to be sufficient for responsibility.
Chris Cho
wiley   +1 more source

Sadraies on Divine Free-Will: a Critical Survey [PDF]

open access: yesحکمت معاصر, 2014
Are ‘Divine freedom’ and ‘necessity of His will and action’ compatible? There are two different answers to this theological question: compatibilism, which confirms the compatibility of these doctrines, and incompatibilism, which claims that those beliefs
Saeed Moghadas, ahmad behashti
doaj  

Albert Bazala’s Compatibilism

open access: yesPrilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine, 2022
In 1910, in the journal Hrvatsko kolo of Matica Hrvatska, Albert Bazala published his article “O slobodi volje” [“On the freedom of the will”], in which he argues for compatibilism between free will and determinism. In this article, I analyze Bazala’s compatibilism.
openaire   +2 more sources

Slow switching and the psychology of memory

open access: yesMind &Language, Volume 41, Issue 3, Page 383-401, June 2026.
This article presents elements of a theory of the representational contents of episodic memory and a new perspective on the relationship between memory and self‐knowledge. These two interrelated outcomes fall out of a novel naturalistic treatment of the debate concerning the compatibility between semantic externalism and a priori self‐knowledge.
Jay Richardson
wiley   +1 more source

An Emergentist Approach to Phenomenal Causality

open access: yesPacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 107, Issue 2, Page 74-85, June 2026.
ABSTRACT Philosophers have long debated whether phenomenal properties can play genuine causal roles. In this article, I aim to develop an emergentist approach to phenomenal causality, an approach that attributes novel causal powers to phenomenal properties and rejects the causal closure of physics.
Lei Zhong
wiley   +1 more source

The Role of Various Readings of Free Will in the Use of Punishment Theories (Focused on Mulla Sadra's View) [PDF]

open access: yesحکمت صدرایی, 2020
Free will is one of the philosophical topics that have important and significant function in the humanities. Various readings of free will have been provided; each of these readings has functions in the humanities that are completely different from other
Mohammad Hosseinzadeh
doaj   +1 more source

Can Soft‐Line Compatibilism Handle Eternally Recurrent Manipulation?

open access: yesTheoria, Volume 92, Issue 2, April 2026.
ABSTRACT A key challenge to compatibilism comes from manipulation arguments. These argue that agents whose actions are manipulated are not morally responsible and that manipulation is not relevantly different from determinism. One common response from compatibilists is to claim that there is a relevant difference between manipulation and ordinary ...
James Andow
wiley   +1 more source

On ‘the Central Argument’ of ‘Freedom and Resentment’: Hieronymi, Russell, and Strawson

open access: yesTheoria, Volume 92, Issue 1, February 2026.
ABSTRACT P. F. Strawson's 1962 essay ‘Freedom and Resentment’ has been enormously influential for the contemporary responsibility discussion. It nevertheless remains contested how the essay is to be understood, and what the central argument is, if there even is any such.
Anton Emilsson
wiley   +1 more source

Local Miracle Compatibilism [PDF]

open access: yesNoûs, 2003
To those people who have not spent much time thinking about the problem of free will, it seems that we frequently have the ability to do otherwise than what we do. Provided I am not subject to any compulsions or coercive forces (addiction, bondage, someone holding a gun to my head, and so on), I am able now to raise my hand, drink some water, read the ...
openaire   +4 more sources

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