Results 71 to 80 of about 4,971 (215)

Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 3, Page 887-915, May 2025.
Abstract To an unusual extent, philosophers agree that counterfactuals have truth conditions involving the most similar possible worlds where their antecedents are true, in the style of the celebrated and path‐breaking Stalnaker/Lewis accounts. Roughly, these accounts say that the counterfactual if A were the case, C would be the case is true if and ...
Alan Hájek
wiley   +1 more source

Two intuitions about free will—Some afterthoughts

Theoria, Volume 91, Issue 2, April 2025.
Abstract In 2014, Christian List and I published a paper that delineated our view regarding what it takes for an agent to act freely. We suggested that this requires the action to be endorsed by the agent and caused by this endorsement and yet not be necessitated.
Wlodek Rabinowicz
wiley   +1 more source

Foreknowledge and causal determinism

Theoria, Volume 91, Issue 2, April 2025.
Abstract I evaluate Patrick Todd's critique of the idea accepted by many, including (in contemporary philosophy) Nelson Pike and John Martin Fischer, that there can be non‐causal constraints on human actions (including basic actions). I suggest that Todd's critical reflections, although illuminating, are not persuasive.
John Martin Fischer
wiley   +1 more source

The closed future

Theoria, Volume 91, Issue 2, April 2025.
Abstract Many philosophers take for granted that there is a strong pre‐theoretical intuition that the future is open and that it is worth trying to make sense of that intuition in theoretical terms. In this paper, I give a characterisation of the ordinary intuition in terms of three elements: our sense of agency, the difference in normativity between ...
Giuliano Torrengo
wiley   +1 more source

What Makes Free Will Free: The Impossibility of Predicting Genuine Creativity

Conatus - Journal of Philosophy, 2020
In this paper I argue that Mill’s ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity’ regarding the human will and action cannot apply on all cases, and that the human mind has potentially the capacity to create freely a will or action that, no matter what kind of ...
Nikos Erinakis
doaj   +1 more source

Compatibilism can be natural

Consciousness and Cognition, 2017
Compatibilism is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Natural compatibilism is the view that in ordinary social cognition, people are compatibilists. Researchers have recently debated whether natural compatibilism is true. This paper presents six experiments (N = 909) that advance this debate.
openaire   +3 more sources

T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick on free agency and the guise of the good

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 56-72, March 2025.
Abstract The history of the thesis of the guise of the good between Kant and Anscombe is not well understood. This article examines a notable disagreement over the thesis during this period, between Green and Sidgwick. It shows that Green accepts versions of the thesis concerning action and desire in one sense of “desire,” and that Sidgwick rejects the
E. E. Sheng
wiley   +1 more source

Free Will and Modal Responsibility

Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
In the last half-century increased awareness of modal issues has been brought to bear on the free will debate. It has been argued that the context dependence of possibility claims can be exploited to mount a defence of compatibilism, the idea being that ...
William Bondi Knowles
doaj   +2 more sources

Evil, Freedom and Heaven [PDF]

, 2018
By far the most respected response by theists to the problem of evil is some version of the free will defense, which rests on the twin ideas that God could not create humans with free will without them committing evil acts, and that freedom is of such ...
Cushing, Simon
core  

Fischer-style Compatibilism [PDF]

Analysis, 2013
John Martin Fischer’s new collection of essays, Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, constitutes a trenchant defence of his well-known compatibilist approach to moral responsibility (Fischer 1994, 2006; Fischer and Ravizza 1998).1 Predominantly a collection of detailed responses to recent critics, this is not a book for beginners.
openaire   +1 more source