Results 81 to 90 of about 4,971 (215)

Are there subintentional actions?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 1, Page 51-74, January 2025.
Abstract When I fiddle with my hair, or adjust my posture, it is plausible that these activities fall well below my cognitive radar. Some have argued that these are examples of ‘sub‐intentional actions’, actions which are not intentional under any description at all.
William Hornett
wiley   +1 more source

Compatibilist's Challenges on Encountering with the Zygote Argument of Manipulation [PDF]

Journal of Philosophical Investigations
In compatibilists believe that we cannot act freely and be morally responsible for an action in a deterministic world, while compatibilists don’t deny the possibility of free action and moral responsibility for the agent, and they believe that we can ...
Zahra Khazaei, Sara Sotoudehnia, Mohsen Javadi   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

The Ontology of Intentional Agency in Light of Neurobiological Determinism: Philosophy Meets Folk Psychology [PDF]

, 2017
The moot point of the Western philosophical rhetoric about free will consists in examining whether the claim of authorship to intentional, deliberative actions fits into or is undermined by a one-way causal framework of determinism.
A Mele, A Mele, AE Monroe, BF Malle, BF Malle, E Nahmias, E Nahmias, E Sosa, H Steward, J Knobe, J Searle, J Searle, J Searle, J Turner, M Balaguer, M Vargas, MJ Rigato, P Inwagen Van, PM Churchland, R Clarke, R Clarke, R Kane, R Swinburne, RE Hobart, RW Sperry, S Nichols, SK Maitra, T O’Connor   +27 more
core   +1 more source

Can Physics Make Us Free?

Frontiers in Physics, 2017
A thoroughly physical view on reality and our common sense view on agency and free will seem to be in a direct conflict with each other: if everything that happens is determined by prior physical events, so too are all our actions and conscious decisions;
Tuomas K. Pernu, Tuomas K. Pernu
doaj   +1 more source

Generic cognition: A neglected source of context sensitivity

Mind &Language, Volume 39, Issue 4, Page 472-491, September 2024.
What is the relationship between the claim that generics articulate psychologically primitive generalizations and the claim that they exhibit a unique form of context sensitivity? This article maintains that the two claims are compatible. It develops and defends an overlooked form of contextualism grounded in the idiosyncrasies of system 1 thought.
Mahrad Almotahari
wiley   +1 more source

Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 109, Issue 2, Page 433-457, September 2024.
Abstract An important question for the causal modeling approach is how to integrate non‐causal dependence relations such as asymmetric supervenience into the approach. The most prominent proposal to that effect (due to Gebharter) is to treat those dependence relationships as formally analogous to causal relationships.
Thomas Blanchard, Andreas Hüttemann
wiley   +1 more source

Relativity of a Free Will Concept Depending on Both Conscious Indeterminism and Unconscious Determinism [PDF]

, 2011
Free will is difficult to classify with respect to determinism or indeterminism, and its phenomenology in consciousness often shows both aspects. Initially, it is felt as unlimited and indeterminate will power, with the potentiality of multiple choices ...
Jansen, Franz Klaus
core  

A New Opening for the Alternative Punishments Debate: Applying the Extended Mind Thesis

Ratio Juris, Volume 37, Issue 3, Page 248-268, September 2024.
Abstract The debate on alternative punishments appears to be stagnating. The impasse may be overcome if we consider humans from a different philosophical perspective. If we answer differently the question of who we are punishing, we open new possibilities regarding the question of how we punish.
Kamil Mamak
wiley   +1 more source

Theological Compatibilism and Essential Properties

Nordicum-Mediterraneum, 2008
Alvin Plantinga defends Theological Compatibilism (TC) and Essentialism about property possession (E). TC is the claim that human freedom to act otherwise and God's essential omniscience are compatible, while E is the claim that every individual entity ...
Nicola Ciprotti
doaj  

Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility [PDF]

, 2018
Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument is that because self-creation is required to be truly morally responsible and self-creation is impossible, it is impossible to be truly morally responsible for anything.
Hartman, Robert J.
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