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The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet–Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes
2018We study the vulnerability or invulnerability of eight voting procedures (Minimax, Dodgson’s, Nanson’s, Copeland’s, Black’s, Kemeny’s, Schwartz’s and Young’s procedures) to 13 voting paradoxes. The invulnerabilities are explained and the vulnerabilities demonstrated through illustrative profiles where the paradoxes occur under the procedures examined.
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
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Social Choice and Welfare, 2010
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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2018
The (in)vulnerability of six ranked voting procedures which are not Condorcet–consistent (Borda count, Alternative vote, Coombs’ procedure, Bucklin’s procedure, Range Voting and Majority Judgment) to 13 paradoxes is examined in this chapter. For those systems that are vulnerable to some voting paradoxes the vulnerability is demonstrated through ...
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
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The (in)vulnerability of six ranked voting procedures which are not Condorcet–consistent (Borda count, Alternative vote, Coombs’ procedure, Bucklin’s procedure, Range Voting and Majority Judgment) to 13 paradoxes is examined in this chapter. For those systems that are vulnerable to some voting paradoxes the vulnerability is demonstrated through ...
Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
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A Consistent Extension of Condorcet's Election Principle
1977Condorcet's principle of choosing the majority alternative whenever one exists is violated not only by Borda's rule but also by any scoring method; nevertheless, the essential property of scoring functions -- "consistency" of the outcome under aggregation of subgroups -- is shown to be compatible with Condorcet's principle.
Young, H.P., Levenglick, A.
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Condorcet Loser in 2016: Apparently Trump; Condorcet Winner: Not Clinton?
American Politics Research, 2021Richard F Potthoff, Michael C Munger
exaly
The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
Mathematical Social Sciences, 1985William V Gehrlein
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The weighted Condorcet fusion in information retrieval
Information Processing and Management, 2013Shengli Wu
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