Results 51 to 60 of about 4,179 (137)
A Strong No Show Paradox is a common flaw in Condorcet Voting Correspondences. [PDF]
The No Show Paradox (there is a voter who would rather not vote) is known to affect every Condorcet voting function. This paper analyses a strong version of this paradox (there is a voter whose favorite candidate loses the election if she votes honestly,
Joaquín Pérez
core
Condorcet admissibility: Indeterminacy and path-dependence under majority voting on interconnected decisions [PDF]
Judgement aggregation is a model of social choice where the space of social alternatives is the set of consistent evaluations (`views') on a family of logically interconnected propositions, or yes/no-issues.
Nehring, Klaus +2 more
core +1 more source
Two-stage Boundedly Rational Choice Procedures: Theory and Experimental Evidence [PDF]
We study and test a class of boundedly rational models of decision making which rely on sequential eliminative heuristics. We formalize two sequential decision procedures, both inspired by plausible models popular among several psychologists and ...
Marco Mariotti, Paola Manzini
core
EQUILIBRIUM AGENDA FORMATION [PDF]
We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined.
Breton, Michel Le +2 more
core
Possible Winners in Noisy Elections [PDF]
We consider the problem of predicting winners in elections, for the case where we are given complete knowledge about all possible candidates, all possible voters (together with their preferences), but where it is uncertain either which candidates exactly
Faliszewski, Piotr +3 more
core
Understanding when and how computational complexity can be used to protect elections against different manipulative actions has been a highly active research area over the past two decades.
Larson, Kate, Menon, Vijay
core +1 more source
A study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games [PDF]
Approval voting features are analysed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: Myerson's Large Poisson Games. I first establish the Magnitude Equiva- lence Theorem (MET) which substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes
Matias Nunez
core
More Borda Count Variations for Project Assesment [PDF]
We introduce and analyze the following variants of the Borda rule: median Borda rule,geometric Borda rule, Litvak’s method as well as methods based on forming linear combinations of entries in the preference outranking matrix.
Hannu Nurmi, Hannu Salonen
core
Vote-processing rules for combining control recommendations from multiple models. [PDF]
Probert WJM +6 more
europepmc +1 more source
And the loser is... Plurality Voting [PDF]
This paper reports on a vote for choosing the best voting rules that was organized among the participants of the Voting Procedures workshop in July, 2010. Among 18 voting rules, Approval Voting won the contest, and Plurality Voting received no support at
Jean-François Laslier
core

