Results 161 to 170 of about 94,619 (177)
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BallotRank: A Condorcet Completion Method for Graphs
arXiv.orgWe introduce BallotRank, a ranked preference aggregation method derived from a modified PageRank algorithm. It is a Condorcet-consistent method without damping, and empirical examination of nearly 2,000 ranked choice elections and over 20,000 internet ...
Ismar Volic, Jason Douglas Todd
semanticscholar +1 more source
Condorcet winners on four candidates with anonymous voters
Economics Letters, 2001zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Condorcet Dimension and Pareto Optimality for Matchings and Beyond
arXiv.orgWe study matching problems in which agents form one side of a bipartite graph and have preferences over objects on the other side. A central solution concept in this setting is popularity: a matching is popular if it is a (weak) Condorcet winner, meaning
T. Kavitha +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
arXiv.org
Multi-dueling bandits, where a learner selects $m \geq 2$ arms per round and observes only the winner, arise naturally in many applications including ranking and recommendation systems, yet a fundamental question has remained open: can a single algorithm
S. Akash, Pratik Gajane, Jawar Singh
semanticscholar +1 more source
Multi-dueling bandits, where a learner selects $m \geq 2$ arms per round and observes only the winner, arise naturally in many applications including ranking and recommendation systems, yet a fundamental question has remained open: can a single algorithm
S. Akash, Pratik Gajane, Jawar Singh
semanticscholar +1 more source
Generalized condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
Social Choice and Welfare, 1984The paper presents a new characterisation result of generalized Condorcet Winner (CW) mechanisms based upon Nash's and Arrow's versions of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. (Theorem 1). In the definition of a CW mechanism a certain number of fixed ballots (one less than the number of agents) are the only endogenous parameters.
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Legislative Leaders as Condorcet Winners? The Case of the U.S. Congress
2016Legislative scholars recognize that legislative output is affected by the legislature’s institutional design. Let us assume that the goals are to avoid chaos and to enhance welfare. Toward these goals there are many variations. Strong committees (Shepsle and Weingast 1987), strong ruling parties (Cox and McCubbins 2004), institutions fostering ...
Robert S. Erikson, Yair Ghitza
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Selecting the Condorcet Winner: single-stage versus multi-stage voting rules
, 2008Michael Peress
semanticscholar +1 more source
Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
Social Choice and Welfare, 2001Fabrice Valognes
exaly