Determination of sequential best replies in n-player games by Genetic Algorithms [PDF]
An iterative algorithm for establishing the Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies (NE) is proposed and tested in Cournot Game models. The algorithm is based on the convergence of sequential best responses and the utilization of a genetic algorithm for ...
Mattheos K. Protopapas
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Product quality, network effects, and efficiency of network markets. [PDF]
Front Psychol, 2022 Zhao D, Song Y.
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Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences. [PDF]
In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int.
Topuzu, Mihaela +1 more
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Transportation price, product differentiation, and R&D in an oligopoly. [PDF]
PLoS One, 2022 Kanehara D, Kamei K.
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Spatial Cournot Competition and Consumers’ Heterogeneity: A Note [PDF]
We consider the standard model of spatial Cournot competition and show that a necessary condition for dispersion equilibria is that the distribution be not unimodal.Spatial Cournot competition, consumers ...
Corrado Benassi
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Dynamics of a Cournot game with bounded rational firms and various scale effects. [PDF]
PLoS OneLi X, Li B, Su L.
europepmc +1 more source
Welfare Implications of Border Carbon Adjustments on the Trade of Harvested Wood Products. [PDF]
Int J Environ Res Public Health, 2022 Liao X, Ning Z.
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Behavioral Convergence Properties of Cournot and Bertrand Markets: An Experimental Analysis [PDF]
This paper reports an experiment that examines the relative convergence properties of differentiated-product Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies. Overall, Bertrand markets tend to converge to Nash equilibrium predictions more quickly and more completely ...
Douglas D. Davis
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Quantum Cournot Triopoly Game with Heterogeneous Expectations: Dynamics and Chaos Control with Isoelastic Demand. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel)Wei L, Wang S, Wang J.
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Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games [PDF]
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game.
Peter Duersch +2 more
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