Results 121 to 130 of about 2,832 (228)
The gamma-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints [PDF]
In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the alpha-core is equal to the beta-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave (Zhao 1999b).
Aymeric Lardon
core
Walrasian equilibrium behavior in nature. [PDF]
Loch-Temzelides T.
europepmc +1 more source
Cost Variations in a Differentiated Good Oligopoly [PDF]
In the homogenous good case, the relationship between market struc- ture and efficiency was studied extensively. Assuming a standard quadratic utility with quantity competition, this paper carries on the analysis in a differentiated good context.
Jens Jurgan
core
Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Outcomes in the Presence of Public Firms [PDF]
We revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot outcomes in a mixed market with private and public firms. A departure from the standard setting, i.e., one where all firms maximize profits, provides new insights. A welfare-maximizing public
Manipushpak Mitra, Arghya Ghosh
core
Dynamic coopetition game between private label and national brand under carbon trading policy. [PDF]
Yu W, Hou G, He Y, Xin B.
europepmc +1 more source
The empirical content of Cournot competition. [PDF]
We consider the testable implications of the Cournot model of market competition. Our approach is nonparametric in that we abstain from imposing any functional specification on market demand and firm cost functions.
Cherchye, Laurens +2 more
core
The Heterogeneity of Firms Behavior at Oligopolistic Market: Price-makers and Price-takers
The paper considers the model of strategic interaction of firms at the quantity oligopoly market. There are several price-makers maximizing profits using the Cournot strategy, and also several price-takers obtaining outputs from the equivalence of price ...
A.Yu. Filatov
doaj
On Cournot oligopolies with a biconcave price function
The power of a recent result for Nash equilibria of sum-aggregative games is illustrated by providing a variant of Ewerhart's equilibrium uniqueness theorem for Cournot oligopolies with a biconcave essential price function. This variant, contrary to the original result, allows for industry revenue that is discontinuous at 0 and can be considered a ...
openaire +1 more source
The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: a reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining [PDF]
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labour union).
Correa López, Mónica, Naylor, Robin
core
Excessive entry in a bilateral oligopoly [PDF]
In a bilateral oligopoly, Ghosh and Morita (‘Social desirability of free entry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis, 2007, IJIO) show that entry is always socially insufficient if the upstream agents have sufficiently strong bargaining power.
Arijit Mukherjee
core

