Effciency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition [PDF]
We derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under Cournot competition. To do so, we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of ½-concavity and ½ ...
Simon P. Anderson, Regis Renault
core
Stability analysis of heterogeneous oligopoly games of increasing players: A computational approach. [PDF]
Hou R, Li X, Wan W.
europepmc +1 more source
Horizontal mergers and successive oligopoly [PDF]
This paper considers a successive oligopoly setting in which a set of upstream firms sell output non-exclusively to a group of downstream firms using a linear tariff.
Steffen Ziss
core
Dynamic complexity of Stackelberg-Bertrand game with one-way R&D spillovers, effective information and government subsidies. [PDF]
Long J, Zheng S.
europepmc +1 more source
Full Separation or Full Integration? An Investigation of the Optimal Renewables Policy Employing Tradable Green Certificate Systems in Two Countries' Electricity Markets. [PDF]
Sun Y, Zhang L.
europepmc +1 more source
The pass-through of alcohol excise taxes to prices in OECD countries. [PDF]
Shang C, Ngo A, Chaloupka FJ.
europepmc +1 more source
Stabilization and Synchronization of a Complex Hidden Attractor Chaotic System by Backstepping Technique. [PDF]
Munoz-Pacheco JM +5 more
europepmc +1 more source
Free trade vs. autarky under asymmetric Cournot oligopoly
The paper compares free trade with autarky in an asymmetric multi-country world with Cournot competition, constant returns and linear demand. We first derive conditions for free trade to hurt a country’s consumers, to benefit its firms, to induce it to ...
Tröge, Michael +2 more
core
Dynamics of a Cournot game with bounded rational firms and various scale effects. [PDF]
Li X, Li B, Su L.
europepmc +1 more source
Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly [PDF]
We study the incentives of oligopolistic firms to share private information on demand parameters. Differently from previous studies, we consider bilateral sharing agreements, by which firms commit at the ex-ante stage to truthfully share information.
Francesco Feri, Sergio Currarni
core

