Results 51 to 60 of about 5,511 (242)

Single-Name Credit Risk, Portfolio Risk, and Credit Rationing [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper introduces non-diversifiable risk in the Stiglitz-Weiss adverse selection model, so that an increase in the average riskiness of the borrower pool causes higher portfolio risk.
Arnold, Lutz G.   +2 more
core  

Historical case study of a transfer experiment that demonstrated the importance of the estuarine ecosystem for the survival of Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) at the Campbell River estuary, British Columbia, Canada

open access: yesJournal of Fish Biology, EarlyView.
Abstract Estuary dependence to the survival of Chinook salmon was investigated at the Campbell River estuary, British Columbia, Canada. Replicate batches of marked smolts were transferred from a hatchery and released in 1983, 1984 and 1985 at four ecosystems, two that ensured estuarine experience (river, estuary) and two seawards of the estuary ...
Colin D. Levings, J. Steve Macdonald
wiley   +1 more source

CREDIT RATIONING IN RURAL INDIA [PDF]

open access: yes
The view that households are credit rationed by the formal sector, rests on the assumptions that all households have a positive demand for formal credit and it is a cheaper source for borrowing.
Ranjula Bali Swain
core  

Asymmetric Information and Credit Rationing in a Model of Search

open access: yesGames
This paper presents a competitive search model focusing on the impact of asymmetric information on credit markets. We show that limited entry by lenders results in endogenous credit rationing, which, in turn, plays a key role in managing adverse ...
Cemil Selcuk
doaj   +1 more source

Character and creditworthiness: Unveiling the role of job titles in peer‐to‐peer lending

open access: yesJournal of Financial Research, EarlyView.
Abstract Using data from the Prosper lending platform, we examine the influence of job‐based trust on credit market dynamics. We find that the generalized trust implied by borrowers' job titles, as a reflection of individuals' ethical and integrity standards in professionals, positively affects listing and loan performance.
Zagdbazar Davaadorj   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Credit rationing, government credit programs and co-financing [PDF]

open access: yes
Costly monitoring may lead to credit rationing in equilibrium in an economy without any adverse selection or moral hazard problems. Given the widespread phenomenon of government intervention in credit markets in developing and developed countries, the ...
Dona Rai
core  

Choosing not to borrow: Imprinting effects of informality on firms’ credit self-rationing

open access: yesBorsa Istanbul Review
While firm financing constraints have been widely studied, limited attention has been paid to credit self-rationing. Based on the imprinting hypothesis and firm-level data from 30 countries, this study finds that informal experience significantly ...
Wenwen Jin
doaj   +1 more source

Segment information disclosure and trade credit

open access: yesJournal of Financial Research, EarlyView.
Abstract We examine the effect of mandatory segment disclosure on trade credit financing. Segment disclosure reduces the information advantage of suppliers relative to investors in evaluating firm default risk, reducing firms' reliance on trade credit. Exploiting the adoption of SFAS 131 as a shock to segment disclosure, we find that segment disclosure
Obada Almajali, Phil Holmes, Bin Xu
wiley   +1 more source

Loan Volume and Interest Rate Determination in a Banking Market with Imperfect Competition [PDF]

open access: yesFinancial Markets, Institutions and Risks
In imperfectly competitive banking markets, the determination of loan volume and interest rates matters because even modest differences in banks’ loan-origination efficiency can alter credit availability, borrowing costs, and the transmission of ...
Achintya RAY
doaj   +1 more source

Banking with Inside Money: An Efficiency Analysis

open access: yesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.
Abstract We show that banks do not decentralize the first best in a nominal Diamond–Dybvig economy with inside money. Furthermore, state‐contingent deposit contracts do not expand the consumption possibility set to include the first best either. Central banks can improve welfare but only for savers and only with unconventional monetary policy. Finally,
DAVID RIVERO   +1 more
wiley   +1 more source

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