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On message integrity in cryptographic protocols
Proceedings 1992 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, 2003An operational model for message integrity in cryptographic protocols is presented, message integrity requirements are discussed, and message structures that satisfy those requirements are suggested. A message splicing/decomposition invariant of the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of encryption is derived and used to identify heretofore-unknown ...
Virgil D. Gligor, S.G. Stubblebine
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Collusion analysis of cryptographic protocols
Proceedings of GLOBECOM'96. 1996 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2002As network applications such as electronic commerce proliferate, complex communications protocols that employ cryptographic building blocks, such as encryption and authentication, will become more common. We view a cryptographic protocol as a process by which information is transferred among some users and hidden from others.
Low, Steven H., Maxemchuk, Nicholas F.
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Cryptographic Protocols Analysis in Event B
2010We consider the proof-based development of cryptographic protocols satisfying security properties. For instance, the model of Dolev- Yao provides a way to integrate a description of possible attacks, when designing a protocol. We use existing protocols and want to provide a systematic way to prove but also to design cryptographic protocols; moreover ...
Benaissa, Nazim, Méry, Dominique
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Analyzing a Cryptographic Protocol
2017Web services such as email, photo, social networks, internet commerce, and online banking require that entities authenticate themselves. Scrooge McDuck must be sure that he (it?) is communicating with the bank, and not with some bad guy with a look-a-like web page.
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Verifying Cryptographic Protocols with Subterms Constraints
2007Known protocol analysis techniques consider protocols where some piece of information expected in a protocol message is located at a fixed position. However this is too restrictive to model web-services where messages are XML semi-structured documents and where significant information (such as name, signature, ...) has to be extracted from nodes ...
Chevalier, Yannick+2 more
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Types for Cryptographic Protocols
2002One of the many different approaches to proving properties of a cryptographic security protocol is to encode it within a process calculus [6],[7],[11],[12],[14],[20], and then to apply standard techniques from concurrency theory such as modelchecking [19] or equational reasoning [4],[5],[8],[9],[13],[15].
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2017
This chapter is concerned with cryptographic protocols. We begin with an explanation of what components a cryptographic protocol consists of. We then illustrate the complexity of designing a secure cryptographic protocol by considering an artificially simple scenario, for which we propose and analyse seven candidate protocols.
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This chapter is concerned with cryptographic protocols. We begin with an explanation of what components a cryptographic protocol consists of. We then illustrate the complexity of designing a secure cryptographic protocol by considering an artificially simple scenario, for which we propose and analyse seven candidate protocols.
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Cryptographic Protocol Analysis of AN.ON
2010This work presents a cryptographic analysis of AN.ON’s anonymization protocols. We have discovered three flaws of differing severity. The first is caused by the fact that the freshness of the session key was not checked by the mix. This flaw leads to a situation where an external attacker is able to perform a replay attack against AN.ON. A second, more
Benedikt Westermann+3 more
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Compiling and narrowing cryptographic protocols
1999We propose a direct and fully automated translation from standard authentication protocol descriptions to rewrite rules. This compiling defines a non-ambiguous operational semantics for protocol executions. The rewrite rules are then translated to first-order Horn Logic and processed by the theorem-prover daTac The existence of flaws in the protocol is
Jacquemard, Florent+2 more
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