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Representation gap for transition factors from social sciences in energy and emissions modeling

Kunnas S, Trutnevyte E.
europepmc   +1 more source

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Stochastic Dominance and Cumulative Prospect Theory

Management Science, 2006
We generalize and extend the second-order stochastic dominance condition for expected utility to cumulative prospect theory. The new definitions include preferences represented by S-shaped value functions, inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions, and loss aversion.
Manel Baucells
exaly   +3 more sources

Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1992
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky
exaly   +3 more sources

On complementary symmetry under Cumulative Prospect Theory

Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 2020
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Jacek Chudziak
exaly   +3 more sources

Cumulative prospect theory's functional menagerie

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2006
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
exaly   +3 more sources

A simple model of cumulative prospect theory [PDF]

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
U Schmidt, H Zank
openaire   +3 more sources

Cumulative prospect theory and gambling [PDF]

, 2005
Whilst Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT) provides an explanation of gambling on longshots at actuarially unfair odds, it cannot explain why people might bet on more favoured outcomes. This paper shows that this is explicable if the degree of loss aversion experienced by the agent is reduced for small-stake gambles (as a proportion of wealth), and ...
M Cain, D Law, D Peel
openaire   +2 more sources

Composite Prospect Theory: A proposal to combine ‘prospect theory’ and ‘cumulative prospect theory’ [PDF]

, 2010
Evidence shows that (i) people overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities, but (ii) ignore events of extremely low probability and treat extremely high probability events as certain. The main alternative decision theories, rank dependent utility (RDU) and cumulative prospect theory (CP) incorporate (i) but not (ii).
Ali al-Nowaihi, Sanjit Dhami
openaire