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Dissociable roles of reward prediction error in the contrasting mood dynamics of depression and anxiety. [PDF]
Wang Z +8 more
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Weaponizing the Appraisal: Justice Violations, Psychological Safety, and Employee Voice in a Saudi Multinational Organization. [PDF]
Mohiya M.
europepmc +1 more source
Contextual influences on risk-taking in children and adults. [PDF]
Lacombe P, Zuberbühler K, Dahl CD.
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Underrepresented transition factors from social sciences in energy and emissions modeling
Kunnas S, Trutnevyte E.
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Risk Aversion in Cumulative Prospect Theory [PDF]
This paper characterizes the conditions for strong risk aversion and second-order stochastic dominance for cumulative prospect theory. Strong risk aversion implies a convex weighting function for gains and a concave one for losses. It does not necessarily imply a concave utility function.
Horst Zank, Ulrich Schmidt
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Stochastic Dominance and Cumulative Prospect Theory
Management Science, 2006We generalize and extend the second-order stochastic dominance condition for expected utility to cumulative prospect theory. The new definitions include preferences represented by S-shaped value functions, inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions, and loss aversion.
Manel Baucells
exaly +4 more sources
Cumulative Prospect Theory for Parametric and Multiattribute Utilities [PDF]
Different attitudes towards gains and losses are a prominent feature of cumulative prospect theory for decision under uncertainty. In particular, decision weights for uncertain events can depend on whether the events involve gains or losses, and the shape of the utility function can reveal loss aversion.
Horst Zank
exaly +5 more sources
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1992zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky
exaly +3 more sources

