Results 181 to 190 of about 27,186 (209)
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Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors
The American Economic ReviewWe use the tools of mechanism design combined with the theory of risk measures to analyze how a cash-constrained owner of an asset with known, stochastic returns raises capital from a population of investors who differ in their risk aversion and budget ...
Alex Gershkov +3 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
The American Economic Review
A nested bundling strategy creates menus in which more expensive bundles include all the goods of less expensive ones. We study when nested bundling is optimal and determine which nested menu is optimal, when consumers differ in one dimension.
Frank Yang
semanticscholar +1 more source
A nested bundling strategy creates menus in which more expensive bundles include all the goods of less expensive ones. We study when nested bundling is optimal and determine which nested menu is optimal, when consumers differ in one dimension.
Frank Yang
semanticscholar +1 more source
Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsMarket design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting.
Ryo Shirakawa
semanticscholar +1 more source
Social Science Research Network
This paper studies executive pay with fairness concerns: If the CEO's wage falls below a perceived fair share of output, he suffers disutility that is increasing in the discrepancy.
Pierre Chaigneau +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
This paper studies executive pay with fairness concerns: If the CEO's wage falls below a perceived fair share of output, he suffers disutility that is increasing in the discrepancy.
Pierre Chaigneau +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Social Connectedness in Bank Lending
The Review of financial studiesWe present evidence that loan allocations and loan terms are closely linked to the strength of social connections between bank and borrower regions.
Oliver Rehbein, Simon C. Rother
semanticscholar +1 more source
Journal of Political Economy
We show how early warning about an impending regime change eliminates panic. Agents anticipate a future shock and decide when to attack. Waiting is costly, especially when others attack and cause a regime change while one waits. This may create panic. We
Deepal Basak, Zhen Zhou
semanticscholar +1 more source
We show how early warning about an impending regime change eliminates panic. Agents anticipate a future shock and decide when to attack. Waiting is costly, especially when others attack and cause a regime change while one waits. This may create panic. We
Deepal Basak, Zhen Zhou
semanticscholar +1 more source
Welfare Comparisons for Biased Learning
The American Economic ReviewWe study robust welfare comparisons of learning biases (misspecified Bayesian and some forms of non-Bayesian updating). Given a true signal distribution, we deem one bias more harmful than another if it yields lower objective expected payoffs in all ...
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Y. Ishii
semanticscholar +1 more source
The Gender Gap in Confidence: Expected But Not Accounted For
Social Science Research NetworkWe investigate how the gender gap in confidence affects the views that evaluators (e.g., employers) hold about men and women. We find the confidence gap is contagious, causing evaluators to form overly pessimistic beliefs about women.
C. Exley, Kirby Nielsen
semanticscholar +1 more source
The Minor Planet Electronic Circulars contain information on unusual minor planets, routine data on comets and natural satellites, and occasional editorial announcements. They are published on behalf of Division F of the International Astronomical Union by the Minor Planet Center, Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
openaire +1 more source
openaire +1 more source
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint ...
Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer, Eyal Winter
semanticscholar +1 more source
A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint ...
Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer, Eyal Winter
semanticscholar +1 more source