Results 11 to 20 of about 57,705 (310)
Strategic Delegation: An Experiment [PDF]
The RAND Journal of Economics, 2001 We examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. We show that when the proposer uses a delegate, her share increases both when the delegate is optional or mandatory. This is true despite the fact that the delegate cannot be used as a commitment device. We also show that unobserved delegation by the responder reduces
Fershtman, C., Gneezy, U.
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021 We study the choice of a principal to either delegate a decision to a group of careerist experts or to consult them individually and keep the decision-making power. Our model predicts a trade-off between information acquisition and information aggregation.
Sebastian Fehrler, Moritz Janas
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Regulation as Delegation [PDF]
Journal of Legal Analysis, 2015 Objective: to consider the conception of reverse delegation, when the government acts a principal and an individual - an agent, from the point of view of behavioral Principal-Agent Theory.Methods: statistical, method, sociological polling.Results: In diverse areas - from retirement savings, to consumer credit, to prescription drug use, to fuel economy ...
O. Bar-Gill, C. R. Sunstein
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On a taxonomy of delegation [PDF]
Computers & Security, 2009 Delegation, from a technical point of view, is widely considered as a potential approach in addressing the problem of providing dynamic access control decisions in activities with a high level of collaboration, either within a single security domain or across multiple security domains. Although delegation continues to attract significant attention from
Quan Pham 0002 +3 more
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Review of Economic Studies, 2008 We analyse the design of decision rules by a principal who faces an informed but biased agent and who is unable to commit to contingent transfers. The contracting problem reduces to a delegation problem in which the principal commits to a set of decisions from which the agent chooses his preferred one.
Ricardo Alonso, Niko Matouschek
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, 2005 In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the Veto-Power Principle: any incentive-compatible outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision.
Mylovanov, Tymofiy
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Flexible and Manageable Delegation of Authority in RBAC [PDF]
, 2007 One of the most challenging problems in managing large networks is the complexity of security administration. Role based access control (RBAC) has become the predominant model for advanced access control.
Linying Su +7 more
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To Delegate or Not to Delegate
, 2014 The use of robots in healthcare is on the rise, from robots to assist with lifting, bathing and feeding, to robots used for social companionship. Given that the tradition and professionalization of medicine and nursing has been grounded on the fact that care providers can assume moral responsibility for the outcome of medical interventions, we must ask
Christine Léon de Mariz +2 more
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017 We discuss a government’s incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a trade‐off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that the government does not have, but at the same time, they have other preferences than the government.
Kundu, Tapas, Nilssen, Tore
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Delegation and motivation [PDF]
Theory and Decision, 2013 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Borowiecki, Karol Jan; id_orcid 0000-0003-4959-181X +1 more
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