Results 21 to 30 of about 118,373 (226)

Criticizing of Daniel Dennett's Argument for Compatibilism [PDF]

open access: yesحکمت و فلسفه, 2016
The purpose of this article is to criticize Daniel Dennett's main argument which has been formulated to explain and justify the compatibility of Human's mental phenomena, particularly his free will, with causal determinism on the basis of ontological ...
Arash khaksari renani   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychology, 2019
For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet no consensus has emerged.
Cory J. Clark   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Determinism, Self-Efficacy, and the Phenomenology of Free Will [PDF]

open access: yes, 2009
Some recent studies have suggested that belief in determinism tends to undermine moral motivation: subjects who are given determinist texts to read become more likely to cheat or engage in vindictive behaviour. One possible explanation is that people are
Holton, Richard
core   +1 more source

Building blocks of ‘free will’: In conversation with Dick Swaab

open access: yesHTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 2020
The issue of free will is a complex one that has occupied the minds of many theologians and philosophers through the ages. The two main aspects of free will are the freedom to do otherwise and the power of self-determination.
Chris Jones, Dawie J. van den Heever
doaj   +1 more source

Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2014
Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special ...
Mackie, Penelope
core   +2 more sources

The Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism in Modern Western Compatibilists and Mulla Sadra [PDF]

open access: yesComparative Theology, 2014
The significance of determinism/ free will dilemma is clear by all enlightened mind as our approach in this regard has a straight influence on our theoretical worldview and scientific orientations in individual and social life.
Fakhrossadat Alavi, Yousof Shaghool
doaj   +1 more source

The concept of free will as an infinite metatheoretic recursion [PDF]

open access: yes, 2015
It is argued that the concept of free will, like the concept of truth in formal languages, requires a separation between an object level and a meta-level for being consistently defined.
Hashim, Hanaan, Srikanth, R.
core   +4 more sources

Determinism and free will in the age of genetics: Theoretical-legal concerns about predictive genetic tests [PDF]

open access: yesFilozofija i Društvo, 2012
The paper deals with the use of predictive genetic tests in medical research. I limit my discussion to those advances in genetics which try to overcome the limits represented by our genetic make-up, in particular by gene mutations that lead, or could ...
Salardi Silvia
doaj   +1 more source

Implications of a Culturally Evolved Self for Notions of Free Will

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychology, 2017
Most schools in psychology have emphasized individual choice despite evidence of genetic and cultural determinism. It is suggested in this paper that the rejection of classical behaviorism by psychology and other humanities flowed from deeply held ...
Lloyd Hawkeye Robertson
doaj   +1 more source

Mere Molinism: A Defense of Two Essential Pillars

open access: yesPerichoresis: The Theological Journal of Emanuel University, 2018
Molinism is founded on two ‘pillars’, namely, the view that human beings possess libertarian free will and the view that God has middle knowledge. Both these pillars stand in contrast to naturalistic determinism and divine determinism.
Stratton Tim, Erasmus Jacobus
doaj   +1 more source

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