Results 31 to 40 of about 89 (87)

Incapability or Contradiction? Deguchi’s Self-as-We in Light of Nishida’s Absolutely Contradictory Self-Identity

Open Philosophy
Deguchi’s Self-as-We aims to vindicate a holistic conception of self by working out the implications of what it is to be an agent in light of the East Asian tradition.
Sawada Jun, Takagi Shunichi
doaj   +1 more source

The sting of negativity: Irad Kimhi and Michael Della Rocca on the Parmenidean challenge

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 32, Issue 2, Page 577-595, June 2024.
Abstract Irad Kimhi considers the conundrum, first addressed by Parmenides, of how negative facts can be the case and be thought, to be the puzzle that philosophy has been working to solve since Plato and Aristotle and wants to do his part by criticizing Frege's dissociation of sense and force and developing a more Aristotelian account of judgment ...
Anton Friedrich Koch
wiley   +1 more source

Why and how to be a Dialetheist

Studia Philosophica Estonica, 2008
In the first part the paper rehearses the main arguments why to be a dialetheist (i.e. why to assume that some contradictions are true). Dialetheism, however, has been criticised as irrational or self-refutating.
Manuel Bremer
doaj  

What is this thing called dialetheism?

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
This paper has two parts. In the first I discuss two claims made by Priest in Some Comments and Replies (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3 27, 2019): (i) that the idea of ‘contradictions in reality’ lacks textual support in his work, and (ii) that such ...
Abilio Rodrigues
doaj   +1 more source

Being Is a Being

Open Philosophy
Heidegger claims that “the Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” While he does not seem to argue for this claim (usually referred to as the “ontological difference”), there is now a very substantial literature that fills this gap.
Czerkawski Maciej
doaj   +1 more source

Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox

Theoria, 2013
AbstractJohn Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G.E.Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining butIdo not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that ofEllie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd.
openaire   +3 more sources

Overinterpreting Logics

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Paraconsistent logics, minimally, are not explosive; that is, on these logics, not everything follows from a contradiction of the form ‘A and not-A’.
Otávio Bueno
doaj   +1 more source

The Fictional Guide to Impossible Truths

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
In this paper, our main goal is to present a new account for contradictions and impossible truths. It is loosely based on both Austin’s account of truth and the Logic of Impossible Truths (LIT), a formal semantics designed to address incomplete ...
Guilherme Araújo Cardoso, Francisco Augusto Nogueira Lages   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality. [PDF]

Acta Anal, 2021
Field C.
europepmc   +1 more source

Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances. [PDF]

Synthese, 2021
Wroński L.
europepmc   +1 more source